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Abstract:   
Emerging research is beginning to identify genetic risk factors which may predict an increased 
likelihood of rejection following transplantation.  The identification of these predictors prompt 
us to consider how we should incorporate this information into the process of transplant 
candidate evaluation and organ allocation, as well as the ethical implications of such 
incorporation.   In order to ground this analysis, this thesis begins with an examination of how 
we consider other predictors of poor transplant outcomes currently, as interpreted in concordance 
with the US transplant system’s dual goals of efficacious and just organ allocation.  It then 
proceeds with a brief summary of the current research on genetic predictors of poor transplant 
outcome, followed by a specific examination of the mechanisms by which these genes are 
investigated.  This allows an examination of the challenges of appropriately applying the data 
gained through common methods of genetic research.   Next, it examines the complex ethical 
and social conflicts which may arise from a decision to incorporate genetic predictors within the 
current US transplantation system.  It then concludes with a proposal for a mechanism for 
including genetic risk profiles into the transplant evaluation process on a national level that will 
seek to mitigate these conflicts and support both a just allocation system and ongoing research 
into this area of medicine.  
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GLOSSARY 
 
Note regarding definitions:  The language surrounding issues of risk, predictions of poor 
outcomes, and cause and effect can be quite obtuse, particularly within the context of genetic 
markers and the like.  For the ease of the reader, I will attempt to standardize the use of several 
of these terms within the context of this manuscript as detailed in the glossary below. 
Allograft:  A transplant of an organ between two individuals of the same species, but different 
genotypes. 
Candidate Genes:  A gene which is being investigated as a potential contributing factor to the 
outcome under consideration 
Genetic Disorder:  A disease associated with a genetic variation or series of genetic variations  
Genetic Marker:  A genetic polymorphism which is associated with an increased likelihood of a 
given outcome based on population-based studies.  These polymorphisms may not result in 
disordered biologic processes themselves, but may be in close proximity to disease-influencing 
genetic material within the genome.  In general, these genomic spatial relationships are 
maintained from generation to generation; thus, there is a statistical, but not necessarily causal 
association between the genetic marker and the outcome in question. 
Genetic Polymorphism:  Frequently occurring variation in a nucleotide sequence. Nucleotides 
are the basic units of DNA—namely, adenine, cytosine, guanine or thymine, and deoxyribose, 
and phosphate.  A polymorphism is said to occur when the most common allele has a frequency 
of no greater than 99 percent. Some forms of some polymorphisms are associated with increased 
risk of disease.  
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Genetic Predictor:  For the purpose of this text, this will refer to a genetic polymorphism that is 
being investigated as a potential predictor of transplant outcomes.  Please see “Predictor” below. 
Genetic Risk Factor:  A genetic polymorphism which results in a disordered biologic process, 
increasing the likelihood that the affected individual will develop a disease (or genetically 
associated trait), as compared to the general population.  One of the most well-known examples 
of a genetic risk factor are particular polymorphisms in the BRCA1 gene, a tumor suppressive 
gene.   
Multi-genic disorder:   A disease which arises due to the influence of many individual genetic 
variations, none of which are independently sufficient to cause the disease, as well as, in most 
cases, other factors. 
Predictor:  A characteristic, which can be assessed prior to initiating a medical intervention, 
which is associated with either increased or decreased likelihood of a given outcome than would 
be expected in the population at large.  For the purpose of this paper, we will largely be 
concerned with characteristics which predict an increased risk of a poor outcome following 
transplantation. 
Proximate Cause:  An event or condition which, if it occurs, has a high likelihood to directly 
and unavoidably result in another event or condition of interest.  As an example, having low 
serum immunosuppressant levels may be considered a proximate cause of organ rejection. 
Remote Cause:  An event or condition which, if it occurs, can contribute to an outcome through 
mediation by other more proximate causes.  As an example, poor medication adherence can 
result in low serum immunosuppressant levels, which in turn may be considered a proximate 
cause of organ rejection  
Risk:  An increased likelihood of a poor or undesired outcome. 
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Single-Gene Disorder:  A single genetic variation which, if it occurs, is sufficient to cause a 
genetic disorder.  This can occur in autosomal dominant, autosomal recessive, or sex-linked 
forms.  In general, to be classified as a “single-gene disorder,” the presence of the genetic 
variation in the requisite number of chromosomes (i.e. on one chromosome for autosomal 
dominant disorders, on both maternally and paternally contributed chromosomes for autosomal 
recessive disorders, etc.) should result in the genetic disorder in nearly all occurrences.  More 
recent research has identified that many single gene disorders have variable penetrance (i.e. 
differing levels of effect on individuals who possess the genetic variation), thus making this 
definition more tenuous.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Since the time that organ transplantation entered the scope of non-experimental medical practice 
in the 1960s, there has been ongoing discussion among medical practitioners, bioethicists, and 
society at large regarding the most appropriate way to allocate the limited supply of organs 
available for transplant.  Although it would be a gross exaggeration to claim that a consensus has 
been reached regarding the optimal construction of an organ allocation system, 1 it is fair to say 
that the majority of proposed organ allocation systems have been concerned with two main 
goals:  1) ensuring a “just” system of allocation in which a large subsection of the society is 
eligible for potential therapy; and 2)  maximizing the quantitative benefit of medical outcomes, 
thereby making the “best” use of an inherently scarce resource.2  While each proposed allocation 
                                                 
1 Within this manuscript the term organ allocation will be used to encompass both the process of determining who is 
eligible for organ transplantation as well decisions regarding the distribution of organs among eligible candidates.  
This is slightly divergent from common usage, where the term organ allocation is often used to address questions of 
organ distribution alone.  However, many of the issues raised and arguments contained within this manuscript can 
apply to either the candidate evaluation portion or the organ distribution portion of the transplant system, and use of 
a single term limits redundancy.  Additionally, certain criteria of organ transplant eligibility are incorporated into the 
rules of the organ allocation system, such as maximal glomerular filtration rate at which a patient can be considered 
eligible for a deceased donor kidney transplant.  As such, a complete distinction between the allocation process and 
candidate evaluation process is not possible.  I have used the more specific terms of transplant candidate evaluation 
process or organ distribution process where specifically appropriate. 
2 The terms “just” and “best” have been designated with quotation marks to acknowledge the fact that these are 
value-laden terms which may mean different things to different readers.  For the remainder of the text, I will 
dispense with such punctuation.  While questions such as “What is Justice?” are philosophically rich and have been 
the subject of far more comprehensive treatises than this, deep consideration of these questions is far beyond the 
scope of this manuscript.  Although this ambiguity will be examined in greater depth in section 2 of this manuscript, 
the reader may benefit from greater clarity regarding these terms from the outset.  When used casually in the text, 
the terms will be used in such a manner as to indicate that the term ”best use” is synonymous with efficacious use 
(i.e., resulting in the longest functional life span for the transplanted allograft or the maximizing the number of years 
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system has placed a differing degree of emphasis on each of these aims, the majority of these 
systems seek to implement a nuanced approach, in which both of these aims are sought in 
varying degrees.  Our current organ allocation systems represent such compromises.  Certain 
characteristics associated with poor outcome (i.e., predictors), such as a history of non-adherence 
to medical care, are considered during the candidate listing and organ allocation process, while 
others, such as lower socioeconomic status, are not considered due to the judgment that inclusion 
of such predictors will undermine the aim of a just distribution of organs.  
Identifying predictors of poor transplant outcomes has been an arduous project.  As organ 
transplantation progressed from being an experimental therapy offered at only a few institutions 
to becoming a routine consideration in conditions of end-organ failure, our understanding of the 
transplant process and its outcomes have similarly progressed.  Initial efforts of simply 
cataloguing the outcomes of transplants performed gave way to broader studies which sought 
correlation between particular patient characteristics and the transplant outcomes.3  With these 
studies came a realization that although identifying the characteristics of patients that were 
associated with a poor outcome was a technically challenging but otherwise straightforward 
scientific endeavor, determining how to incorporate these findings into organ allocation policy 
involved decisions fraught with ethical import. 
Some predictors of poor transplant outcome, such as blood group or other immunologic 
incompatibility are purely biologic in origin.  Other predictors of poor outcome however, such as 
gender, ethnicity, demographic and cultural factors emerge from a complex interplay of biologic, 
                                                                                                                                                             
of life gained among the recipient population).   The term “just,” in turn, will be used to describe an allocation 
scheme which seeks to minimize the potential of having a disproportionate number of allografts being dispensed to a 
given segment of the population. 
3 See Santiago-Delpin et al. (1983) or Coulson et al. (1976). 
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psychological and societal forces.4  While consideration of these predictors during the organ 
allocation process may allow a more efficacious outcome, it can also lead to a system of 
allocation which does not meet the criteria of just distribution discussed previously.5  With the 
non-biologic predictors of poor outcome, the reason for this injustice is clear.  Allowing 
predictors within this second category to influence organ allocation runs the risk of perpetuating 
disparities for which society may already be culpable to a greater or lesser degree.  However, 
even consideration of biologic predictors of poor outcome can result in allocation decisions 
which are not considered just, despite being rooted in largely unbiased scientific fact and 
therefore somewhat insulated from the assignation of ethical value.  As an example, prior to 
2003, the policy of the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) was to given priority to 
patients who had 0 mismatches at three human leukocyte antigen (HLA) loci: HLA-A; HLA-B; 
and HLA-DR.  However it was observed that that African American recipients generally 
exhibited different HLA-B markers than the donor population as a whole.  As a result, if 
allografts were strictly matched by HLA criteria, the effect would be a systematic diversion of 
allografts to the White recipient population.6  In 2003, UNOS made the decision to disregard 
HLA-B matching in allocation decisions.7   While subsequent research has not demonstrated the 
expected worsening of individual recipient outcomes,8 the fact remains that UNOS, as the body 
entrusted with establishing an allocation policy consistent with societal values, has at times 
elected to disregard even biologic predictors of poor outcome in circumstances where a just 
allocation system would not result from their consideration. 
                                                 
4 See Bunzel and Wollenek (1994) and Bunzel and Laederach-Hofmann (2000). 
5 See Orentlicher (1996) for an interesting evaluation of the ethical and legal interactions between these 
psychosocial predictors and the Americans with Disabilities Act. 
6 See Roberts et al. (2004). 
7 Ibid. 
8 See Ashby et al. (2011). 
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As the medical field increases its understanding of the remote and proximate causes of 
poor outcomes following transplantation, it has begun to identify new predictors of these 
outcomes.  In turn, these predictors must be evaluated for technical and ethical validity before 
they are included in decision making regarding allocation.    
 Emerging research is beginning to identify genetic risk factors which may predict an 
increased likelihood of rejection following transplantation, and therefore predict a poor medical 
outcome if transplantation is performed in the affected populations.  This field of research is in 
its nascency, and while the current investigations of specific genes may or may not result in the 
identification of verifiable predictors of poor transplant outcome, advances in the fields of 
pharmacogenomics and genomic medicine suggest that specific genetic risk factors do exist and 
will eventually be identified.  This path of inquiry evokes several important questions.  How 
should we as a society consider data regarding patient populations who are genetically at risk for 
a poor renal transplant outcome?  How should we incorporate this information into the process of 
organ allocation on both a national and institutional level? What ethical pitfalls may be 
uncovered if these predictors are incorporated with insufficient consideration of the ethical 
implications?  It is these questions that I will examine more closely throughout this manuscript.   
I would note that throughout this manuscript I have responded to these questions with respect to 
the context of the US transplantation system, although many of the arguments may be 
generalized to other nations and cultures.   
Before addressing these questions, it is important to establish the framework that will 
ground this analysis.  To that end, I will begin in the next (second) section with a discussion of 
how we consider predictors of poor outcomes currently, as interpreted in concordance with our 
dual goals of an efficacious and just outcome.  An understanding of current evaluation of these 
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predictors is essential to understand how genetic polymorphisms that are being investigated as 
potential predictors of transplant outcomes (these will be referred to as genetic predictors in the 
remaining body of the text) should interlace with our current models.  After the foundational 
blocks of the analysis are established, I will then proceed to a consideration of the emerging 
genetic predictors themselves.   
I will begin the third section with a brief summary of the current research on genetic 
predictors of poor transplant outcome.  While the specific genes that are being investigated are of 
limited importance for my argument (particularly given the preliminary nature of this area of 
research), an examination of the mechanisms by which these genes are investigated can offer 
insight into any parallels that may exist between genotype as a predictor and the broad categories 
of predictors examined in section two.  Additionally, I will consider implications of questions 
regarding the quality of the data gained through common methods of genetic research.  I will 
also discuss the means by which common genetic research methods can instill an unwarranted 
faith in the applicability of genetic findings which may have significant influence on the decision 
making processes of individual transplant programs.     
In the fourth section of the manuscript, I will examine the implications of genetic 
predictors of poor transplant outcome in relation to the notion of justice as an issue of 
distributive justice among social groups.   I will examine the how the effects of including these 
genetic predictors of poor transplant outcome in the organ allocation process would be altered 
depending on the strength of the predictors identified and the prevalence of a given predictor 
within society as a whole.  As the final topic within this section I will also examine both the 
ethical and social implications of incorporating genetic predictors within two broad organ 
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categories:  those organs which are necessary to sustain life (such as the heart, lungs and liver) 
and those organs for which a sub-optimal but functional replacement exists (i.e., kidneys).   
In the fifth and final section of this manuscript, I will consider how the use of genetic risk 
profiles may be incorporated into national and institutional policies for organ allocation.  I will 
also examine the implications of incorporating genetic risk factors within our current system of 
transplant program evaluation, which assesses the outcomes obtained by individual programs 
with only limited adjustment for the overall risk profile of individual transplant candidates.  As 
part of this discussion, I will consider the ethically perverse incentives for programs to “cherry-
pick” genetically identified low-risk candidates and how this tendency to select low risk 
candidates may be further potentiated by the move towards “pay-for-performance” models 
within the broader healthcare system.  Finally I will propose a mechanism for incorporating 
genetic risk profiles into the transplant evaluation process on a national level.  This mechanism 
will seek to support both a just allocation system and ongoing research into this area of medicine.  
Ultimately, the aim of this manuscript is a pragmatic one, as I will attempt to detail the 
manner in which we can both practically and appropriately incorporate within our current system 
our burgeoning understanding of the role that genetic factors play in organ transplant outcomes.  
As such, my discussion regarding current transplant processes will be largely descriptive, 
focused on my interpretation of the ethical underpinnings and principles that influence the 
system as it currently exists, rather than providing an ethical critique of the existing system.   
However, as I begin to discuss our understanding of genetic predictors and analyze their 
similarities and dissimilarities to the predictors of poor transplant outcome currently used within 
the existent transplant system, I will begin to take both a more critical, normative approach.  
Although we are bound by some of the limitations of the current transplant system, each addition 
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or revision offers the opportunity to make the system more ethically sound, and I am hopeful that 
our thoughtful discussion of the optimal way to incorporate emerging genetic predictors of poor 
organ transplant outcomes will support that goal. Indeed, critical reflection on the incorporation 
of such genetic predictors of outcome may ultimately lead to criticism of currently used outcome 
predictors and even other aspects of the existing transplantation system. Such wholescale critique 
is, however, beyond the scope of the current project. 
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2.0 THE CRYSTAL BALL:  HOW WE CONSIDER PREDICTORS OF OUTCOME IN 
ORGAN ALLOCATION DECISIONS 
 
 
Not all predictors of poor outcome are considered equal within our current organ allocation 
systems.  If they were, the allocation process would be relatively simple.  We would simply use 
the best available research to assess the impact of each predictor, quantify the effect of all 
potential predictors of poor outcome which could influence a potential organ recipient and 
incorporate the resulting value within our allocation formula.  We have instead adopted a system 
that places ethical weight on both the reason that the predictors affect a given individual and the 
influence that the inclusion of such predictors in the organ allocation process will have on the 
outcomes of the allocation process as a whole. 
 While issues of organ allocation policy have provided fertile soil for the growing corpus 
of the bioethics literature, the field as a whole has focused on the questions that arise from the 
consideration of individual predictors rather than a systematic analysis of how we consider these 
predictors in general.  As a result, while bioethicists have examined questions such as individual 
recipients’ culpability for their diseases9 or the implications of socially induced predictors of 
                                                 
9 See Moss and Siegler (1991) or Ho (2008) as examples.  
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poor transplant outcomes,10 development and examination of systems for classification of 
predictors have been neglected.  This is unfortunate, as such classification systems can be a 
useful aid in in evaluating the ethical implications of novel predictors of poor transplant 
outcomes by highlighting the similarities between these novel predictors and those which been 
more thoroughly analyzed.  Absent such a prevailing system of classification, I will proffer my 
own interpretation of how predictors of poor outcome are considered within the ethics of organ 
allocation.  
The consideration of various predictors of poor transplant outcome is, at its heart, a re-
capitulation of the broad concern regarding the dual goals of an efficacious and just transplant 
process.  In regard to efficacy, we first consider the magnitude of the risk for poor outcome 
associated with a given predictor.  For example, any behavior associated with a decreased life 
expectancy, such as riding a motorcycle or engaging in other risky recreational activities, will 
necessarily be associated with decreased allograft longevity to the extent that the behavior is 
associated with increased morbidity and mortality, because a transplant patient who dies as a 
result of risky behavior will die with a functioning allograft in place.  Within current transplant 
policies, such deaths are indicative of a less than maximally efficacious transplant outcome.  
However, for many such activities, the increased risk resulting from participation is very small 
and therefore is not considered while making transplant allocation decisions.  In contrast, other 
predictors, such as poor medical adherence or other the presence of other concurrent serious 
illnesses, are associated with a more substantial risk of poor transplant outcome. 
We then consider the question of whether or not the inclusion of said predictor in the 
transplant process would unduly disadvantage a subset of potential participants within the 
                                                 
10 See Lowe et al. (1995). 
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transplant process, i.e., we ask whether the outcome of employing the predictor as an allocation 
criterion is just.  When we discuss the broad concept of justice as applied to questions of 
transplant organ allocation, we are primarily concerned with the notion of justice in two ways:  
as a notion of fairness and equitable opportunity for transplant as it applies to the individual and 
as the notion of distributive justice as it applies to populations.  Both types of justice affect the 
way in which we judge individual predictors of poor transplant outcome, as we will discuss 
further below.    
The intersection of these two factors (efficacy and justice) yield four potential 
categorizations:  1) those predictors which are associated with an excessively high magnitude of 
risk of poor outcome for which consideration of  in the allocation system is just; 2) those 
predictors which convey an excessively high magnitude of risk of poor outcome for which 
consideration in the allocation system is unjust; 3) those predictors which convey an measurable 
but not excessive risk of poor outcome for which inclusion in the allocation system is just; and 
finally,  4) those predictors which convey a measurable but not excessive risk of poor outcome 
for which inclusion in the allocation system is unjust.  
 The stark simplicity of this categorization, however, obfuscates a crucial underlying 
uncertainty:  we have no definite criteria for determining what denotes an excessive risk of poor 
outcome or what results in an undue exclusion or disadvantage within the allocation system.  
Each of these categories is somewhat ill-defined, influenced by a variety of technical, social and 
cultural considerations.  
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2.1  AN EXAMINATION OF CATEGORIES OF EXCESSIVE RISK 
 
In general, what is universally considered a predictor of excessive risk has been limited to very 
few circumstances.  These include severe co-morbid conditions that are expected to severely 
limit lifespan after transplantation or result in intra-operative mortality (such as active infection, 
poor overall health or extreme age), conditions with a high level of recurrence following 
transplant (such as atypical hemolytic uremic syndrome or certain autoimmune conditions) or a 
positive cross-match indicating an immunologic sensitivity to the potential allograft.  In light of 
the inherent pragmatism of the organ allocation system, the severity of the risk of poor outcome 
conveyed by these predictors is generally considered to be sufficient justification for their 
inclusion among the criteria assessed in the allocation process.  
The second category, composed of predictors of excessive risk which should not be 
included in the allocation system due to resulting injustices in organ allocation, is more difficult 
to understand.  As such, conducting a thought experiment to better characterize this category 
may be helpful.  For the purpose of this exercise, accept for a moment that we have been able to 
firmly establish what magnitude of risk of a poor outcome should be considered excessive.  
Within this system, any predictor which is associated with a 10x or greater risk of poor outcome 
as compared to the general population is considered sufficient justification to not consider 
transplantation in any individual who has that predictor.  This policy is then incorporated into the 
allocation system.  In a certain sense this policy is completely just in that it focuses exclusively 
on the expected outcome for the patient and is applied to all potential organ recipients.   
However, imagine for a moment the predictor in question is an individual’s ethnicity or 
gender.  Does this change whether or not patients with this predictor should be excluded from the 
transplant process (e.g., all women per our example)?  If we say that these individuals should be 
12 
 
excluded due to the risk of poor outcome, we are, in a way, saying this criterion is acceptably 
just.  If instead we decide that we will tolerate worse transplant outcomes overall to allow 
individuals who possess these predictors to participate, aren’t we also saying that the risk is, in 
fact, acceptable?  Given the inherent malleability of our thresholds of excessive risk and 
acceptable injustice, it becomes clear that populating this category with examples from the real 
world is incredibly difficult.   
In order to shed the complexities of the question of what counts as excessive risk, one 
could consider a circumstance in which the predictor was associated with a poor outcome in 
100% of all cases.  Such a predictor would be contained in this category if it was guaranteed to 
result in a poor outcome, but was disregarded while making allocation decisions because taking 
it into account resulted in unjust allocation outcomes.  In a practical sense, however, such 
guaranteed poor outcomes could not be ignored based on considerations of justice, because it 
would be inappropriate to “inflict” poor medical outcomes on individual patients and unjust to 
inflict them on identifiable groups of patients for the sake of treating that group like members of 
other groups. With a guarantee of a poor outcome, that group is relevantly different from others. 
In its most minimal, formal conception, justice requires treating relevantly similar people 
similarly and relevantly dissimilar people dissimilarly.  Although process-oriented ethical 
systems such as deontological or virtue-based ethics do attribute an ethical value to the intrinsic 
nature of an act independent of the outcomes reached, they would be rendered nonsensical if they 
urged that all considerations of resulting outcomes be disregarded.  As such, while this second 
category of predictors exists as a philosophical consideration, it plays relatively little role in the 
day to day considerations of allocation policy. 
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2.2  AN EXAMINATION OF CATEGORIES OF ACCEPTABLE RISK 
 
The primary focus for the remainder of this section is the third and fourth categories of 
predictors:  those predictors associated with a measurable but not overwhelming risk of poor 
outcome for which their inclusion in allocation decisions is considered just or unjust 
respectively.  In order to distinguish these categories from one another, it is clear that a more 
explicit description of what is meant by the terms just and justice within the context of organ 
allocation is required.   
Unfortunately, such a description is very difficult to undertake.  Within the context of 
Principlism,11 the dominant ethical approach in contemporary bioethics literature, the principle 
of justice clearly encompasses a larger scope than the other principles considered (beneficence, 
non-maleficence and autonomy respectively).  The concept of justice arises from moral and 
ethical questions within the context of human interactions and, as such, can be expressed in an 
almost innumerable array of general and specialized theories.  Moreover, the ideas and themes 
used to discuss questions of justice have shifted over time, making any attempt to provide a 
broad overview of the scope of the question even more difficult.12  As one moves away from 
philosophical theories expressly designed to instill a degree of universality into the question of 
justice towards the more concrete and pragmatic expressions of justice within cultural and social 
contexts, the issue becomes even more muddied.  Within the realm of political and social policy, 
justice is rarely considered as an abstract concept per se.  Instead, considerations of justice are 
                                                 
11 Beauchamp and Childress (2013) 
12 Despite this difficulty, David Wiggins (2004) provides an interesting discussion of the contrast between the 
Aristotelian and Neo-Aristotelian and the more modern liberal concepts of justice in his aptly named “Neo-
Aristotelian Reflections on Justice.”  Michael Sandel’s (2007) “Justice:  A reader” offers reasonable excerpts from a 
variety of prominent philosophers on the subject. 
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often expressed as certain aspirational goals which help to define the purposes and aims of the 
society in question. 
How then, do we consider issues of justice within the context of organ allocation for 
transplant?  I would argue that as a pragmatic matter the organ allocation process is primarily 
concerned with justice at two levels.  The first is the notion of justice as fairness as experienced 
by the individual patient.  Within this context, each individual patient is concerned with the 
notion of equitable access to organ transplantation on a personal level.13  This amounts to asking 
whether one has as much opportunity as the next individual to be considered for a potential 
transplant.  Such concerns provided the impetus for many of the characteristics of the deceased 
donor organ allocation programs as they are currently constructed.   
Although the organ transplantation system itself cannot address (or at least to date has not 
attempted to) sources of inequity such as differences in wealth or personality that may influence 
how early in the disease process a patient enters the transplantation system as a potential 
candidate, within kidney transplantation, the goal of equitable access is expressed by the fact that 
the time a potential transplant candidate spends on the transplant waiting list is the primary 
determinant of organ allocation.  It should be noted that this is not an absolute goal, as the organ 
allocation system as constructed is designed to avoid rampant injustices in access and allocation, 
rather than being designed to target one single conception of justice. As such, some modification 
and exceptions are permitted to match organs with recipients who are particularly well-suited to 
that organ, as in the case of perfectly matched HLA markers.  Although an individual recipient 
may be harmed (or, at least, fail to be benefitted) by such a diversion of the organ from a more 
strict first come, first served system, the deviation is deemed acceptable because everyone on the 
                                                 
13 This notion of equitable access is derived from Norman Daniel’s (1985) book “Just Healthcare.”  
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list has an  opportunity to benefit from such a diversion.  In other circumstances, donor kidneys 
are diverted to patients who otherwise have difficulty being matched due to a high rate of 
immunologic incompatibility with the donor population as a whole, generally described as 
having a high panel reactive antibody (PRA) percentage.  While this practice may not benefit the 
majority of patients, the benefit is potentially available to any individual.  Prior to the evaluation 
process a potential recipient does not know if he or she will have a high PRA or if he or she will 
develop a high PRA during the course of his or her treatment.  As is the case with diversion of 
organs to individuals with a perfect HLA match, this deviation from the just structure of 
allocation based  purely on the criterion of time spent on the waiting list is deemed acceptable 
because any patient, prior to beginning the transplant evaluation process, has a similar potential 
to benefit from this deviation.  Thus, the goal of equitable access is supported.  In general, these 
deviations from the so-called “standard” practice of the allocation of deceased donor kidneys 
based on waiting time are generally well tolerated by theorists and the public.   
The second level at which justice is considered is at the level of social policy.  Such 
social policy is concerned with the equitable distribution of resources (organs available for 
transplant) among broadly recognizable social groups, such as specific racial minorities or age 
categories.14   I will acknowledge that the distinction between the broader discussion of 
individual and categorical (or class) equity can be difficult, since all members of a class are also 
individuals; inequities due to distribution policies between categories of people can be 
experienced as individual inequities within populations, and importantly for this paper’s 
argument, characteristics of individuals can form the basis for identifying a social group.  
Nevertheless, there is a broad understanding that some distributive policies can disadvantage 
                                                 
14 See Lamont (2014). 
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certain classes, even if the mechanism resulting in such disparity may be acceptable on the 
individual level.   
The clearest example of this phenomenon can be demonstrated by the efforts of the 
United Network of Organ Sharing (UNOS) to address racial disparities in deceased donor kidney 
allocation in the early 2000s that was discussed in the introduction of this manuscript. To review, 
in 2003, UNOS re-wrote its deceased donor allocation rules so that one component of human 
leukocyte antigen (HLA) matching, HLA-B matching, was no longer considered in the allocation 
process.15  This revision was due to concerns that HLA-B matching greatly restricted the number 
of organs allocated to African-Americans, while offering only a limited improvement in 
transplant outcomes.  As a group, African-Americans demonstrate clustering of HLA-B 
genotypes which were less prevalent among the majority White population.  The fact that 
African-Americans are disproportionately likely to develop End-Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) in 
comparison to their White counterparts,16 coupled with strict adherence to HLA-B matching 
criteria, resulted in a large subsection of potential African-American transplant recipients being 
restricted to receiving transplants from a disproportionately small subsection of the total pool of 
deceased donor organs. 
  For the purpose of this discussion, the policy revision represents a fascinating and 
ethically salient policy shift, as the inclusion of HLA-B matching criteria can be deemed either 
just or unjust, depending on whether it is viewed through an individual or societal lens.  From 
the individual’s standpoint, the inclusion of HLA-B matching criteria is easy to justify.  The 
inclusion of HLA-B matching represents an effort to obtain the best possible outcome for the 
recipient who receives the donor organ.  For a given individual, the expectation is that a closer 
                                                 
15 See Ashby et al. (2011) for a description of this policy change and the resulting effects. 
16 See U.S. Renal Data System (2013). 
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HLA match will improve longevity of the organ after transplant.  Thus, the individual may gain 
some benefit from the more restrictive matching criteria.  It is true that any given individual may 
benefit more from disregarding such restrictive matching criteria—thereby receiving an allograft 
more quickly—than they would from receiving an allograft that is more closely matched, but one 
would be hard pressed to say either approach is inappropriate or unjust when examined from the 
viewpoint of an individual patient. 
In contrast, from the standpoint of the societal concerns of distributive justice, the 
argument against the inclusion of HLA-B matching in the allocation process is much more clear.  
The inclusion of HLA-B matching criteria resulted in the systematic diversion of potential 
transplant allografts from a minority group (which historically has experienced numerous health 
disparities) to a majority group.  If the improvement in post-transplant allograft longevity 
resulting from consideration of the HLA-B matching criteria were profound, the resulting racial 
disparity in transplantation rates might be considered an unfortunate but justifiable trade-off; 
absent those profound differences in post-transplant allograft longevity, these disparities in 
distribution were considered unacceptable. 
Now that these two levels of justice (individual equity and distributive justice among 
social groups) have been characterized, we can return to our consideration of the third and fourth 
categories of predictors:  those predictors associated with a serious (but not overwhelming) risk 
of poor outcome for which consideration in the allocation system is just and those for which 
consideration in the allocation system is unjust.   
How do we determine whether the consideration of a given predictor in the allocation 
process is just?  In practice, I would argue that such decisions have hinged largely on whether or 
not we believe that the predictor is modifiable (or was at one time modifiable) by the potential 
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transplant recipient.  If the predictor is deemed modifiable, there is a societal inclination to argue 
that those potential recipients are somewhat culpable for their disease.  In those circumstances, 
we (as a society) have deemed it just that these predictors be considered in allocation decisions.    
The predictors which are generally considered to be modifiable by the potential transplant 
recipient are those factors which are primarily the result of health behaviors.  These include   
alcohol or drug abuse, tobacco usage, obesity and a history of medication non-adherence.  While 
medical research has established that many of these health behaviors can be influenced by 
complex genetic, psychological and environmental factors,17 there continues to be a broad social 
perception that these behaviors are, at their core, volitional.  This societal perception is not 
incorrect.  There is an important distinction between a pre-disposition to alcohol dependence, 
which can be avoided through adherence to a decision to abstain, and an increased risk of breast 
or colon cancer, which may only be avoided through radical surgery.  While this difference may 
seem to be intuitively obvious to many individuals, it bears some further examination.   
Why exactly are these cases different?  On superficial examination, it may be the burden 
of the preventative steps that we expect an individual to take.  Abstaining from alcohol is seen as 
a relatively minor sacrifice, one that is undertaken by a large number of individuals for a variety 
of health, social, philosophical and religious reasons.  In contrast undergoing a prophylactic 
mastectomy because one has a BRCA1 or BRCA2 mutation, or undergoing a colectomy due to 
the presence of an APC gene mutation, seems to be a much greater burden, and we understand 
why individuals would elect to proceed with or forgo these procedures.  This is not the sole 
difference between these two categories however.  If an individual with a pre-disposition to a 
                                                 
17 See O'Rahilly and Farooqi (2006) and Feng et al. (2010) for an interesting discussion of the genetic and 
environmental factors influencing obesity.  See Melotti et al. (2011) for a large scale cohort study examining the 
association between socio-economic status and tobacco experimentation. 
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disease such as cancer were to forgo standard monitoring for cancer prevention, such as 
mammograms or colonoscopy, we might find that decision foolish, but if those individuals then 
develop cancer we are unlikely to consider them morally culpable in the same way that we find 
an alcoholic responsible for his or her liver disease.  In many ways, our notion of the potential 
transplant recipient’s responsibility for his or her illness continues to have roots in traditional 
moral theory and intuitions.  Within the field of formal bioethics, there has been extensive 
discussion regarding whether or not such moral evaluations accurately reflect our contemporary 
understanding of illnesses such as alcoholism, addiction and substance dependency and whether 
or not such moral evaluations are appropriate, but no singular consensus has been reached.18 One 
potential difference between the circumstances described (the alcoholic who continues drinking 
and the patient with a known predisposition to serious illness who fails to take available 
precautionary measures) is that we consider the need to moderate one’s alcohol consumption 
within the bounds of safety and the social propriety of the circumstance to be ethically 
obligatory, an obligation which met by many people in many circumstances.  Therefore, we are 
not particularly forgiving of lapses in this regard and deem the individual responsible for the 
outcome, whether it be an automobile accident which occurs when one is drunk or cirrhosis 
which develops after years of heavy drinking.  In contrast, the need to undergo unusual or 
invasive medical testing and therapies may be viewed as supererogatory to the common human 
experience and as such we are more forgiving of failures to pursue these measures.  What is 
deemed to be obligatory and what is deemed to be supererogatory are themselves an extension of 
our common moral intuitions and a reflection of social attitudes.  As such, this distinction 
                                                 
18 See Moss and Siegler (1991) and Glannon (1998) for examples of con and pro arguments, respectively. 
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remains one of description of our practices, rather than the product of pure ethical reasoning.  
Hence the lack of philosophical or social consensus on this issue as noted above.19 
However, it is important to recall that while organ allocation policy is informed by 
careful philosophical consideration, it is not strictly the product of such consideration.  Instead it 
represents a pragmatic approach attempting to reflect many societal stakeholders and viewpoints.  
Moreover, as a social system that relies on public support, the organ transplantation system has 
traditionally taken into account some prevailing social attitudes and values, for example, in 
accepting the notion that organ donors would prefer to donate their organs to recipients locally, 
rather than to those geographically distant. Thus, the uncertainty of “professional” ethicists 
regarding the meaning and degree of culpability that many patients have for their illnesses is 
only one of many considerations taken into account when establishing organ allocation policies 
and practices; the opinion of the general populace is important as well.  Although contemporary 
data on public opinions about organ transplantation in the case of diseases for which the potential 
recipient is deemed culpable is sparse, previously published reports demonstrate a unanimity 
which is difficult to come by in empiric research; the public places lower priority on medical 
treatment for those who are deemed responsible for their illness.  In 1990, in response to state 
bill SB 27, for example, the state of Oregon sought to explicitly prioritize different medical 
treatments to provide a rational basis for determining the priorities of Medicaid, the state based 
                                                 
19 As an aside, I would note that the difficulty with this construction is that what we deem ethically obligatory and 
ethically supererogatory may be influenced by our own projected experience.  Given that many of us have not 
experienced an overwhelming psychologic or physiologic compulsion to consume alcohol for example, our 
experience regarding the ease of abstaining may be very misleading.  If the compulsion to consume alcohol is near 
absolute for example, resistance of such a compulsion might be considered a supererogatory act, just as it might be 
considered supererogatory to share one’s food with a starving individual if you were starving yourself.  I personally 
feel that the distinctions in culpability between the alcoholic who develops cirrhosis from heavy drinking and the 
individual who suffers a poor health outcome in the setting of blatant disregard of known medical risk factors are far 
more dependent on how the burdens of “appropriate” behavior are experienced by the individuals in question and 
therefore cannot be determined categorically.  However, a further discussion of this topic is beyond the scope of this 
manuscript.  
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insurance program for the indigent.  Although the technical procedures used to arrive at this 
prioritization were complex, they depended substantially on public opinion regarding the 
importance of treating each condition with a given therapy.   The disparity in prioritization of 
liver transplant for patients with alcoholic and non-alcoholic cirrhosis was stark; liver 
transplantation for non-alcoholic cirrhosis was listed with a priority of 361 out of 714 possible 
topics, while liver transplantation for alcoholic cirrhosis was given a priority ranking of 695.20  
More recent surveys have demonstrated similar preferences.21   
Nor is alcohol use the only behavior which is stigmatized.  Surveys of the public have 
revealed that they feel that patients with a history of smoking should be given a lower priority for 
heart transplant.22 Moreover, certain activities are treated with greater moral opprobrium.  In a 
study released in 1999, Peter Ubel and colleagues surveyed a group of potential jurors in  
Philadelphia to determine how they would allocate hearts for transplants between three potential 
recipients: one with a history of eating high fat and cholesterol foods, one who was a smoker, 
and one who had used intravenous drugs.23   The respondents were least likely to allocate the 
organs to a potential recipient who had used intravenous drugs, even in circumstances in which 
the expected outcome would be best for that patient.  Social support for the allocation of health 
care resources, particularly organs for transplant, based on an assessment of a recipient’s 
culpability for a given illness has been established by a variety of other studies as well.24 
                                                 
20 See Dixon and Welch (1991). 
21 See Neuberger et al. (1998), Ratcliffe (2000). 
22 See Ratcliffe (2000, Sears Jr et al. (2000). 
23 See Ubel et al. (1999).  Note, the use of potential jurors in this circumstance represented a sample of opportunity, 
but one that was thought to be somewhat ideal as the juror pool is drawn from a broad swath of the public at large 
and therefore was deemed to be largely representative. 
24 See the meta-analysis by Tong et al. (2010)   for an assessment the literature on this topic. 
22 
 
Moreover, individual transplantation programs are given wide latitude in determining 
which potential recipients are acceptable candidates for organ transplantation.25     While the 
refusal to proceed with transplantation due to perceptions of such culpability alone has been 
condemned by the American Medical Association,26 among others, the fact that individual 
programs are the ultimate arbiters of whether or not a given individual should be listed for 
transplantation allows for the influence of factors such as the perceptions of the culpability of the 
patient for his or her medical condition to influence candidate evaluation and listing decisions. 
Further, prohibition of denying access to transplantation services based on the cause of organ 
failure is complicated by the fact that behaviors associated with organ failure may very well 
contribute to poor health or allograft failure after transplantation. Consideration of these 
behaviors, particularly if ongoing (such as smoking) or unresolved (such as obesity) may have a 
justifiable role in determining a patient’s candidacy for transplantation.  Unfortunately, there is 
evidence to suggest that assessments of culpability, whether conscious or unconscious, play a 
role in candidate evaluation by individual programs above and beyond the quantitative risks of 
poor outcomes for the patient or allograft following transplantation.  An archetypical example of 
this issue is the allocation of livers for transplantation within the United States.   
 While an in-depth examination of the allocation protocols is beyond the scope of this 
manuscript, the basic premise behind liver allocation is relatively straightforward.  Patients are 
given a score (MELD or PELD for potential adult and pediatric recipients respectively) based on 
how ill they are, which is used to determine the urgency of transplantation; those who require 
                                                 
25 This approach has its own inherent strengths and weaknesses.  From a justice standpoint, this variation in practice 
can be highly problematic.  A given patient in transplant center A may be deemed an appropriate candidate for 
transplant, while a near identical candidate at transplant center B is not, a clear failure to achieve the goal of 
equitable access. 
26 See Clarke et al. (1995). 
23 
 
transplantation most urgently are given top priority.27  While it is possible that an individual will 
be deemed too sick to be a transplant candidate, that threshold is high. Within the allocation 
system priority is given to those individuals expected to die within 7 days without a transplant, 
which illustrates that extreme illness is not a clear contraindication.  Moreover, many systemic 
illnesses, such as cystic fibrosis, which would be expected to limit the recipient’s overall life 
span significantly, are incorporated into the allocation system with patients who have such 
illnesses being granted priority within the allocation system.  As such, it is clear that obtaining 
the maximal utility from each graft is not the primary goal of the liver allocation process.  
Instead, the primary goal is to “rescue” patients from what would be an otherwise fatal illness.  
As such, one might presume that the etiology of the patient’s liver illness would play a limited 
role in allocation decisions, apart from the determination of the patient’s MELD or PELD score 
as detailed above.  The reality for patients who have alcoholic liver disease is much different 
from this presumption however.   
 The formal UNOS allocation system does not discuss the issue of alcoholic liver disease 
in any form.  However, individual programs often require potential transplant recipients with 
alcoholic liver disease to meet strict criteria before they are registered with UNOS as a transplant 
candidate.  A study performed in in 1996 by Everhart and Beresford demonstrated that over 80% 
of US liver transplantation programs would consider active alcohol use to be an absolute 
contraindication to liver transplantation.   While more contemporary data from the United States 
has not been published, policies of requiring patients with alcoholic liver disease to be abstinent 
from alcohol use for at least six months prior to transplant continue to be common place.28   
                                                 
27 See the UNOS website [http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/governance/policies/] for current policies and procedures 
United Network of Organ Sharing (2015) 
28 See Lucey (2011). 
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 Policies regarding liver transplant for alcoholic liver disease are interesting from an 
ethical standpoint, however, because there is little evidence that patients with alcohol related 
liver disease do worse after transplant.29 Although alcohol recidivism is associated with a worse 
outcome 10 years after transplant,30 there is little to no evidence that being abstinent for 6 
months or more prior to transplant results in lower rates of alcohol use recidivism.31 Therefore, 
there is no clear medical evidence that suggests that patients who are using alcohol until shortly 
before transplant are at an increased risk of poor outcome.  Why, then, do we treat active alcohol 
use as a contraindication to liver transplant?  Since there is no difference in the risk of a poor 
outcome between the population using alcohol prior to liver transplant and the population not 
using alcohol prior liver transplant, the decision of transplant programs to use active alcohol use 
as a criterion for determining whether or not they should proceed with transplantation is not 
based on a determination of acceptable versus excessive risk.  Instead, it is a reflection that the 
transplant programs feel that it is just to consider alcohol use as sufficient criteria to not proceed 
with transplant, thereby precluding consideration of patient’s actively using alcohol within the 
formal deceased donor allocation system. 
In light of the studies and practices described previously, it appears clear that as a society 
we believe that when we are considering priorities in organ allocation for transplantation there is 
an ethically relevant difference between individuals whose illnesses are proximately related to 
modifiable behaviors and those individuals whose illnesses appear to arise from random chance 
alone.  This social belief may, however, rely on an unsophisticated understanding of both the 
                                                 
29 See Lim and Keeffe (2004). 
30 See Faure et al. (2012). 
31 See Rodrigue et al. (2013).  A recent study performed  by Mathurin et al. (2011) examining the use of emergent 
transplantation for acute decompensation in acute alcoholic liver disease in which there was no abstinence prior to 
being emergently hospitalized shows rates of recidivism equivalent to the population of patients with alcoholic liver 
disease at large. 
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culpability of the “bad” actors and the lack of culpability of other parties.  Nevertheless, given 
the known influence that a variety of health behaviors can have on the course of many diseases, I 
do agree that the categories of culpable and non-culpable appropriately carry a degree of ethical 
weight, but also believe that while this determination of culpability has ethical value, it is an 
insufficient reason to deny someone access to transplantation.  For the purpose of this project’s 
argument, what is critical is the fact that society does currently embrace, and employ in 
transplantation policy, a distinction between causes of organ failure for which a person is 
deemed culpable and those for which a person is not. What is at issue here is how perceptions of 
culpability interact with beliefs about emerging genetic predictors of transplant outcomes and 
perceptions of the immediacy of the impact of those genetic factors. 
 
 
2.3  IMPLICATIONS FOR GENETIC PREDICTORS OF POOR TRANSPLANT OUTCOMES 
 
The preceding examination of how the public, practitioners and transplant allocation systems 
employ predictors of poor transplant outcomes was intended to provide a framework within 
which we can examine the emerging genetic predictors of poor transplant outcome.  The next 
(third) section will briefly examine current research on those genetic predictors with an emphasis 
on the how the nature of the information obtained correlates with degrees of risk of a poor 
outcome.  This will allow us to consider how different types of genetic predictors should be 
considered along the axis of risk assessment.  Then, in the fourth section we will consider the use 
of these genetic predictors from the standpoint of justice.   
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3.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL QUESTIONS:  
CURRENT RESEARCH INTO GENETIC PREDICTORS OF POOR TRANSPLANT 
OUTCOME 
 
 
3.1  THE ACADEMIC GOLD RUSH 
 
One needs to only open any medical journal or newspaper to encounter the ways in which 
genetic research will begin to shape the future of modern medicine.  The field of organ 
transplantation is no exception.  A review article by Almoguera, Shaked and Keating within the 
American Journal of Transplantation32 examines the current status of genetic research within the 
field of solid organ transplantation.  During the course of their review they evaluated over 1000 
published studies.  Although the number of the studies reviewed is not profound, the short time 
span over which these studies were produced is staggering.  In a 2000 editorial review in Current 
Opinions in Nephrology and Hypertension,33 the use of genetic polymorphisms to predict and 
shape transplant outcomes is cited as an area of emerging research that will shape the field of 
organ transplantation in the coming century and by 2014 there were 1000 studies to review.   
 A comprehensive overview of the scientific findings of the research thus far is not 
necessary for the present project.  However, it is important for the purposes of this manuscript to 
turn a philosophical eye toward these data and to understand the type of information being 
                                                 
32 See Almoguera et al. (2014). 
33 See Suthanthiran (2000). 
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produced.  Studies have begun to identify genetic markers which predict an increased risk of 
poor outcome following solid organ transplantation through a variety of mechanisms.  Some 
have studied post-transplant outcomes directly.  For example, Mytilieneos et al. investigated a 
variety of gene polymorphisms associated with cytokines which are thought to play a role in 
modulating the body’s immune response to the transplanted organ.34  They studied a cohort of 
2298 primary and 1901 repeat recipients of deceased donor kidney transplant.  Although the 
majority of the genetic polymorphisms they investigated showed no clear association with post-
transplant outcomes, one gene polymorphism identified at the 308 position of the Tumor 
Necrosis Factor Alpha (TNFα) gene (a potent pro-inflammatory protein), which resulted in a 
high rate of production of TNFα, was found to be associated with a significantly greater risk of 
graft failure in the setting of a repeat kidney transplant.  Patients with this genetic polymorphism 
had a relative risk of graft failure within the first 3 years post-transplant of 1.96, as compared to 
genotypes associated with less TNFα production.  A study by Golshayan et al. examining 
outcomes of over 700 kidney transplant recipients enrolled in the Swiss Transplant Cohort Study 
demonstrated that gene polymorphisms of the manose-binding lectin(MBL) 2 gene associated 
with low MBL levels were associated with an a 1.75 times greater risk of acute cellular rejection 
within the first post-transplant year.35 
 Other studies have identified polymorphisms associated with an increased risk of serious 
infection after transplantation.  A study from the OPERA study group, a prospective 
observational cohort of 315 recruited through 25 Spanish transplant centers investigated the 
influence a number of single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) associated with a variety of 
immuno-regulatory molecules had on the likelihood of developing active infections with the 
                                                 
34 See Mytilineos et al. (2004). 
35 See Golshayan et al. (2016). 
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cytomegalovirus after kidney transplantation.  This study examined the effects of both individual 
polymorphisms, as well as “profiles” based on the number of unfavorable polymorphisms 
(identified as being associated with an increased risk of CMV infection by the preliminary 
phases of the study) possessed by the patients.  This study demonstrated that patients with 2 
unfavorable polymorphisms were 2.29 times as likely to develop a CMV infection, and patients 
with 3 unfavorable polymorphisms were 2.36 times as likely to develop a CMV infection, in the 
12 month period after transplantation, as compared to the patients with only 0 or 1 unfavorable 
markers.36  
 Others have focused on the effects that an individual’s genes have on his or her response 
to the medications used in the post-transplant setting, contributing to the field of 
pharmacogenomics.  A 2015 meta-analysis performed by Rojas et al. evaluated the effects that 
CYP3A5 6986A>G polymorphism had on tacrolimus levels and transplant outcomes. 37 This 
polymorphism has been associated with increased expression of CYP3A5 and increased 
metabolism of tacrolimus (a commonly used immunosuppressant medication) from its active to 
inactive form.  They demonstrated that kidney transplant recipients who carry this allele have an 
increased risk of acute rejection (odds ratio (OR) of 1.32) and chronic nephrotoxicity (OR of 
2.42) as compared to the transplant recipients who did not carry the CYP3A5 6986A>G 
polymorphism. 
 If the iterative nature of scientific research has taught us anything, it is that our 
understanding of individual scientific facts is often obsolete almost as soon as it is reached.  It is 
important to note that this research is investigational and will require further verification before 
implementation in the clinical setting should be considered.  Certification of tests for clinical use 
                                                 
36 See Fernández-Ruiz et al. (2015) for further details. 
37 See Rojas et al. (2015). 
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involves a lengthy regulatory process and is generally reliant on results of multiple studies. 
However, some of these barriers are becoming less absolute then they may have been previously.  
Outside of the clinical setting, consumers are gaining access to their own genetic data, which 
may one day be useful for informing medical decisions.  Genetic testing in the medical setting is 
becoming more common and may identify findings whose significance becomes more evident 
over time.  Finally, the developing availability of next generation sequencing techniques which 
allow for approaches such as whole exome sequencing have the potential to identify numerous 
abnormalities, some of which could inform assessments within the organ transplantation process.  
The question of what to do with these incidental genetic findings remains a controversial one.38  
Although current guidelines from organizations such as the American College of Medical 
Genetics recommend reporting only particular findings of clear medical significance, both what 
is considered significant and the overall approach of only reporting findings pertinent to the 
reason for testing (or, alternatively, only clearly medically actionable findings) have the potential 
to change in the future.   Therefore, it is important that we begin to consider how we will choose 
to incorporate information regarding genetic predictors of risk of poor transplant outcomes when 
it becomes better established.   
 In many ways, genetic information has captured the public attention in a more dramatic 
way than other areas of scientific research.  It has become linked to the historic understanding of 
one’s “nature,” the essence of one’s self which cannot be shifted or changed.  This in turn has 
influenced how we think about genetic predictors, as absolute indicators of one’s genetic destiny.  
The reality however, is much less definite.  Although one’s genome is relatively immutable, the 
effects of the code on an organism level are much less fixed.  In order to best consider how we 
                                                 
38 See Green et al. (2013) and Burke et al. (2013) as two representative arguments regarding the merits of either 
disclosing or withholding incidental findings of next-generation genetic testing. 
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should incorporate these newly identified genetic predictors of transplant outcome, it would be 
useful to consider the epistemological implications of the major types of genetic research, to 
allow us to draw parallels to how we consider already established predictors of transplant 
outcome.  
 
 
3.2  THE IMPORTANCE OF GOOD BREEDING:  THE PEDIGREE APPROACH 
 
Our original insights into the field of genetics were gleaned through the examination of carefully 
recorded pedigrees, examining the familial nature of certain traits.  Although we have moved 
beyond the scrivenings of Gregor Mendel and his seemingly innumerable pea plants, this 
approach has still played a crucial role in modern medical genetics.  These techniques, refined 
over the past century, served as the basis for identifying that abnormalities in the CFTR gene can 
cause cystic fibrosis39 and that polymorphisms of the BRCA tumor suppression gene are 
associated with a much greater risk of developing breast cancer or ovarian cancer than the 
general population.40  Using the pedigree approach, families were identified in which the genetic 
disorder of interest was more common than in the general population at large.  This allowed for 
genetic analysis to identify changes in the genome that were evident in patients who had the 
condition of interest, but were not present in individuals who did not have that condition.  By 
repeating these studies in multiple families we were slowly able to identify first the general 
chromosome locations of concerning genes, and then the genes themselves.  Such approaches 
only provide part of the necessary information however.  Once these genes of concern are 
                                                 
39 See Cutting (2015). 
40 See Xu and Solomon (1996). 
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identified, the next stage is often an attempt to generalize this information outside of a given 
pedigree.  To determine this, researchers frequently utilize a technique known as the candidate 
gene approach. 
 
 
3.3  CLASSICAL EXPERIMENTS BY ANOTHER NAME:  THE CANDIDATE GENE 
APPROACH 
 
The second major category of research utilizes what is known as the candidate-gene approach.  
In many ways, it is these studies that most closely parallel the techniques used in other, non-
genetic, sub-disciplines of biology and the other sciences.  In the candidate-gene approach, the 
researcher first hypothesizes that a given gene may have an effect on the process of interest, 
based on a pre-existing understanding of molecular biology, cellular biology or physiology.  The 
researcher then seeks to identify variants in or near those genes which may affect the process 
being studied.  Finally, the researcher studies variations in these genes within a population and 
seeks to determine if variations in these genes are associated with a given outcome (e.g., the 
disease being studied.)41 
 Ultimately, these studies seek to identify abnormalities that cause, at least in some small 
measure, the diseases being studied.  As such, this represents a disease focused, rather than 
population focused approach.  By basing the selection of the genes being studied on a pre-
existing belief that an observed association between a genetic marker and a given disease is 
plausible, it lends credence to the belief that the genetic marker and the outcome in question are 
                                                 
41 See Tabor et al. (2002) for a more detailed description of the candidate-gene approach as well as a discussion of 
some of the strengths and weaknesses of these studies. 
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causally linked.  These studies are not without their critics however.  One commonly raised 
criticism is that our current body of knowledge is insufficient to provide enough plausible genes 
to study.42  Although other research, such as the aforementioned pedigree studies, can help 
supply new testable hypothesis, these processes are insufficient.  Furthermore, despite designs 
that are intended to identify genetic markers of broad significance, in many cases attempts to 
replicate the findings of candidate gene studies fail.43  This failure may be due to a variety of 
factors.  First, genetic studies are quite sensitive to sampling biases, as the result of the genetic 
heterogeneity both within and between given populations.  Thus, what is found to be significant 
in one population which shares certain genetic tendencies may not be significant when applied to 
other populations.  Second, given the vast array of testable genetic hypothesis, elementary 
statistics suggest that some findings thought to be clinically significant will be false associations.  
Given the well characterized phenomenon of publication bias, in which studies that identify 
significant findings are more appealing to journals, whereas similar studies which show no 
significant effects are rarely offered or accepted for publication, these findings may be published 
in rates that are disproportionate to their occurrence in research as a whole and studies which 
would contradict these findings may not be as frequently published.44  It is partly due to these 
limitations, that the third broad approach that we will consider has been developed:  the genome 
wide association study. 
 
                                                 
42 See Zhu and Zhao (2007). 
43 See Ioannidis et al. (2001). 
44 See Ioannidis et al. (2014) for a good discussion of publication bias in general.  See Clarke et al. (2012) for a 
confirmed example of profound publication bias through comparison to unpublished data. 
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3.4  THE ALLURE OF BIG DATA:  THE PROMISES AND PITFALLS OF GENOME WIDE 
ASSOCIATION STUDIES 
 
As I have just mentioned, one of the common critiques of the candidate gene approach is that we 
don’t know enough about the genetic underpinnings of diseases to generate informed hypothesis 
regarding candidate genes.  What if it was possible to look for genetic markers associated with a 
particular disease without any fore-knowledge of plausible connections between those genetic 
markers and the disease in question?  Such an approach would bypass the limitations that result 
from our incomplete understanding of disease processes.  Moreover, these approaches would 
avoid investigator bias toward studying specific sections of the genome, which could slow the 
progress of our understanding if those sections of the genome were eventually found to yield 
little useful information. 
 Genome wide association studies (GWAS) are designed expressly to address those 
aforementioned limitations of the candidate gene approach.  GWAS are designed to examine 
either large portions of or the entirety of an organism’s genome through comprehensive genetic 
sequencing and to repeat this analysis on many individuals.  This then allows researchers to 
identify numerous small variations in the genome, known as single nucleotide polymorphisms 
(or SNPs).  Many of these SNPs occur in portions of the genome that have no known 
significance and do not appear to influence how an organism functions; if these SNPs were 
randomly distributed among the population they would not be useful for identifying any 
influence of genes on a given disease.  The reason identifying SNPs can be helpful is that these 
changes are not randomly distributed among the population or across the genome.  Instead, when 
an individual inherits a given variation at one of the SNP sites from his or her parents, they also 
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likely to inherit the portions of the genetic code which are adjacent to that SNP.  By examining 
large groups of individuals, GWAS seek to identify portions of the genome that seem to be 
associated with manifestation of a disease.  These findings can then be used to direct future 
investigatory efforts (by identifying genes that can then be examined through the previously 
discussed candidate gene approach) or can be used as a direct means of assessing genetic risk.45 
 The primary appeal of this approach is that it is not dependent on an a priori presumption 
of the influence that a given section of the genome will have on a particular disease.  As a result, 
it allows for the discovery of new avenues of inquiry, much in the way that pedigree studies do, 
rather than simply existing as a means to test existing hypothesis.  This approach has many 
limitations however.  The first is the technical challenge of obtaining the data.  This approach is 
computationally difficult and requires a vast amount of information to obtain significant results.  
This need for large data sets can make verification of the findings of any single study difficult.46  
In contrast to those used in more traditional study designs, the statistical tools and approaches 
necessary to perform a robust analysis of the data provided by GWAS are still being 
developed.47  There continues to be controversy regarding the optimal statistical design, and 
different statistical approaches vary widely in how conservative they are in identifying as 
significant particular associations within a given data set.48  This is especially problematic 
because many clinicians, as well as the public, lack the statistical savvy to understand these 
limitations.  The final statistical output, the p-value, is commonly used in scientific literature and 
                                                 
45 See Wray et al. (2013) for a discussion of the limitations of the use of GWAS for this purpose.  I will expand on 
this analysis in a later section.  
46 Ibid. 
47 See Sham and Purcell (2014) for a discussion of some of these techniques. 
48 Ibid. 
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as such there may be an inclination to interpret and use the outcomes of these more complex 
genetic studies in a manner similar to interpreting more straightforward statistical constructs.   
 Moreover, there are certain complexities that arise from the fact that these studies reveal 
findings that are meaningful within a particular genetic cohort.  For example, a certain SNP may 
be associated with overall height within study subjects of a Norwegian background, but not 
among those of a Southeast Asian background.  If these populations are studied independently, 
this conclusion is simple; the association is found in one study but not the other.  If these 
populations are studied concurrently however, such as studying associations within a broad US 
cohort for example, a statistically significant association may be found which only applies with 
validity within a subgroup of that cohort, even though clinically, or even in additional scientific 
research, the association is applied to the population as whole.  Moreover, although nationality 
can be a useful proxy by which to identify a biologic cohort in some homogeneous populations, 
even in this circumstance it has its limitations.  The limitations of nationality and other social 
identifiers were examined in depth by Foster and Sharp.49  As they note, our social identity is 
multifactorial, including geographic, familial, ethnic and national identities.  A given genetic 
polymorphism may be associated with any one of those sources of identity, making attribution 
difficult.  Although our own understanding of our social identity can be a powerful tool in 
identifying these associations, our social identity may not include all pertinent biological facts.  
Studies examining the utility of self-identification of race and ethnicity for medical research have 
produced mixed results.50  This has led to efforts to identify pertinent population groups solely 
on the basis of comprehensive genotyping alone, but this approach remains technically 
                                                 
49 See Foster and Sharp (2002).   
50 See Tang et al. (2005) and Campbell et al. (2005) for examples where self-identification of race and ethnicity 
were respectively predictive and non-predictive of population stratification. 
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challenging and remains incapable of answering important questions.51  How do you define these 
population subgroups?  How do you determine the implications for subjects who clearly fall 
within multiple subgroups?52 
 Essentially, GWAS studies suffer difficulties in population identification to an extent 
that, I would argue, many forms of medical research do not.   In most medical research, 
increasing the study sample size is one of the (theoretically) easiest ways to improve the quality 
of the data generated; in GWAS studies non-targeted expansion can limit the data applicability 
by obscuring the population to which the information is most applicable. 
 
  
                                                 
51 See Tian et al. (2008) for a broad discussion of some of the issues involved.  For a more technical overview of 
potential methods of statistical correction see Nsengimana and Bishop (2012) or Qin and Zhu (2012). 
52 For a more thorough discussion on the complex history of and academic debate regarding genetic markers of 
racial and ethnic identity I would recommend reading the excellent paper by Morris Foster (2009), “Looking for 
race in all the wrong places: analyzing the lack of productivity in the ongoing debate about race and genetics.”  
Unfortunately, further discussion of this fascinating topic is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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3.5  BEYOND THE METHODS TO THE MEANING:  HOW WE APPLY GENETIC 
RESEARCH TO INDIVIDUALS 
 
I have now detailed three major methods of genetic research, each with their own strengths and 
weaknesses.  With this information in hand, I will shift my focus to the nature of the information 
provided by these studies and how it may be applied to aid decision making with regard to the 
individual patient.  As an exercise, it may be useful to consider how the evolution of the 
methodologies themselves, from pedigree studies to candidate gene studies and onward to 
GWAS have paralleled the shifting meaning of the information gained from genetic research.   
When genetic research was in its nascency, the initial pedigree studies sought to identify 
families who have demonstrated a greater frequency of developing the genetic disorder in 
question.  In a sense, the research identified a class of individuals (in this case the family 
grouping), each of whom is presumed to be at greater risk of developing the genetic disorder 
than the “average person.”  This risk is not based on the assessment of any individual’s inherent 
risk per se, but simply due to that individual’s membership within a given class.   In turn, the 
candidate gene studies sought to move from this broad description of presumptive risk toward an 
assessment of the risk experienced by a given individual, rather than a type of individual.  This is 
done by identifying the genetic polymorphisms that are associated with the genetic disorder 
being researched.  Theoretically, if these are identified and confirmed, it allows us to assess an 
individual’s risk for an outcome based on the presence of the polymorphism in that individual, 
rather than based on the individual’s membership in a group at greater risk. 
Of course, this theoretical goal is not always achieved.  Some conditions are single gene 
disorders, where the genetic disorder is associated with changes within a single gene.  In most 
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cases, this change is both necessary and sufficient to cause the genetic disorder in question.  If 
the presence of this genetic abnormality is sufficient to result in the genetic disorder, interpreting 
an individual’s genetic testing is relatively straightforward.  If an individual has the genetic 
polymorphism which causes the disease (or two copies of the genetic polymorphism in the case 
of recessive conditions), than that individual likely either has the genetic disease or will develop 
it in the future.  If those genetic polymorphisms are not present, the individual does not have the 
disease or risk thereof.  Although the information that serves as the basis of the genetic testing 
was derived from studies assessing risk as member of a group, it can know be interpreted in 
relation to the individual patient, independent of group status. 
In other circumstances, such as is exemplified by our experience with the BRCA1 
mutation, the gap between our analysis of group risk and individual risk is more difficult to 
bridge. Although the presence of a BRCA1 mutation is known to contribute to the likelihood of 
an individual developing breast cancer, the fact that not all individuals who have this 
polymorphism go on to develop breast cancer shows that the mutation alone is not sufficient to 
cause cancer; those breast cancers that are associated with BRCA1 mutations are considered 
complex conditions, as it is the mutations in association with environmental factors that result in 
disease.  The initial research on BRCA1 examined the risk of developing breast cancer for 
individuals who also had a family history of the disease.53  The risk faced by individuals with the 
BRCA1 mutation who do not have a family history of breast cancer is much less clear.54  This 
led the United States Preventive Services Task Force to recommend against population based 
                                                 
53 See Moyer (2014). 
54 See McClain, Palomaki, et al. (2005) for a discussion as to why extrapolation of BRCA1/2 gene penetrance within 
a family based study population is likely not applicable to the general population. 
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screening for the BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutations when they reviewed the available data in 
2014.55   
In regard to our broader analysis, it is clear that in the general population without any 
family history of breast cancer, the risk associated with having BRCA1 mutation remains 
unknown.  This creates the interesting circumstance in which in some populations (i.e., those 
with a family history of breast cancer) a finding of a BRCA1 mutation can be considered a risk 
factor for developing breast cancer while in other populations (i.e. those without a family 
history) it cannot (or at least cannot be considered a risk factor to the same degree). Though this 
line of analysis remains in principle correct with regard to the BRCA1 and BRACA2 mutations, 
there is growing interest in population screening (i.e., screening among individuals without 
family history).56  The example of the utility of BRCA1/2 testing to assess a person’s risk within 
the context of group membership remains relevant for the purpose of comparison within this 
paper.57 
We have now established three broad categories detailing the relationship between an 
individual and a given genetic marker:  1) Those for whom genetic testing has revealed an 
individualized risk; 2) Those for whom genetic testing can reveal a person’s risk within the 
context of group membership; and, 3) Those for whom genetic testing has not provided 
information about risk, even if those same findings might be informative in another context.  
These categories will be important as we examine the implications of incorporating these 
findings into organ allocation decisions. 
                                                 
55Ibid.  
56 See King et al. (2014)for one such argument.   
57 See Nelson et al. (2014) for a summary of published research supporting the use of BRCA1/2 testing in high risk 
populations. 
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 As we consider pedigree studies, they most clearly fall within the second category, 
whereas an individual’s degree of risk may be ascertained with some accuracy due that 
individual’s membership within a certain group (i.e., the family cohort).  Candidate gene studies, 
if they successfully identify genetic abnormalities which appear to have a causative (though not 
deterministic) role in producing the outcomes studied, seek to identify the subject’s 
individualized risk.  Therefore, they would fall within the first category.  The information 
obtained from GWA studies is interesting because insofar as one falls squarely within the 
parameters of a study population, if the finding of risk was robust, it may reflect an 
individualized risk (i.e., the first category).  As one moves to the margins of the population 
definition, however, or as the findings become less robust, the information provided by GWA 
studies, as applied to the individual, may begin to fall in the second or third categories.   
This notion of variable meaning is not unique to GWAS. All empirically derived data are 
epistemologically uncertain in similar degrees.  Just as a medication may be found to be broadly 
effective in treating a certain condition but may not be efficacious for every individual who takes 
that medication, the findings of genetic studies may be more or less applicable to a certain 
population or be of greater or lesser significance given the nature of the genetic variation.  If this 
information is used to decide which is the best course among a variety of reasonable medical 
therapies, we take this uncertainty in stride, as such an uncertainty is a necessary result of our 
incomplete knowledge.  If we are using this empirically derived data to determine whether or not 
one should be given access to superior or life-sustaining therapy, however, the question of how 
applicable the data is to the person for whom the decision is being made is of vital ethical 
importance.  Given that the findings of GWA studies are often very sensitive to what might be 
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thought to be small variations in population characteristics,58 as opposed to more “traditional” 
studies which depend on more crude designations of population characteristics (e.g., age, gender, 
disease type,) the likelihood that research results derived from GWAS will be used to inform 
decision making in an inappropriate population may be much greater.  It is this difference which 
raises some, albeit not all, of the ethical questions that arise when considering incorporation of 
genetic information into the organ allocation decision making process.    
 
 
3.6  A PLACE FOR EVERYTHING AND EVERYTHING IN ITS PLACE 
  
Drawing a precise line between what is considered an acceptable and unacceptable risk of poor 
outcome is beyond the scope of this analysis.  Moreover, it is impossible to do so without 
recourse to normative analysis that is also beyond the paper’s scope, as the precise delineation 
between an acceptable or unacceptable risk is better addressed by means of a societal consensus 
determining acceptable rules and guidelines, rather than by a declarative statement of the 
fundamentally “correct” answer. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this project’s consideration of 
the appropriateness—and especially the justice—of using genetic predictors of transplant 
outcome in allocation decision, it is helpful to stipulate some level of unacceptable risk. This 
enables us to consider on a how different types of genetic predictors—i.e., genetic predictors 
resulting from different types of research—should be considered within the conceptual model of 
acceptable and unacceptable risk that I have presented.  Therefore, for the purpose of this 
discussion, I will posit that any genetic polymorphism associated with an 80% or greater 
                                                 
58 See Qin et al. (2010) for a description of the problem of population variation in GWAS and how it can affect our 
understanding of previous study results. 
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likelihood of allograft loss or death within 5 years confers an unacceptable level of risk, while 
one associated with a 79% or less likelihood allograft loss or death within 5 years does not 
confer an unacceptable level of risk.   How would we categorize each type of genetic finding? 
 The findings of a pedigree study are reasonably parsable under this framework.   Let’s 
begin by considering a theoretical neurodegenerative disease that has been described in a single 
family spanning many generations. The disease has been found to have either a more severe or 
less severe course based on the presence of particular modifying genes.  If a member of the 
family has this disorder along with genetic polymorphism A, it has been associated with a very 
rapid progression of the disease, with a 90% chance of that family member proceeding to 
complete respiratory failure and subsequent death within 5 years of developing the first clinical 
signs of the disease.  In contrast, members of the family has this neurologic disorder along with 
genetic polymorphism B are much more likely to have a more indolent course with a 30% 
chance of proceeding to complete respiratory failure within 5 years of developing their first 
symptoms.  Based on the stipulated criteria demarcating an unacceptable level of risk,  
individuals from this family who have developed clinical symptoms of this neurologic condition 
and have genetic polymorphism A would not be considered acceptable candidates for kidney 
transplant in the setting of kidney failure, as that individual’s likelihood of suffering death from 
respiratory failure in the next 5 years would be 90%, i.e., greater than the 80% likelihood of 
death or allograft failure that we have established denotes an unacceptable risk of poor outcome.  
In contrast, individuals from this family who have developed clinical symptoms of this 
neurologic condition and have genetic polymorphism B would be considered acceptable 
candidates for kidney transplantation as their likelihood of suffering death from respiratory 
failure in the next 5 years would be 30%, which falls within the range of what we have 
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established denotes an acceptable degree of risk. If the findings of this pedigree study have not 
been replicated in populations beyond this family (i.e., a candidate gene study had never been 
performed to determine if genetic polymorphism A and genetic polymorphism B had predictive 
value for this neurodegenerative disease more universally), the presence of these genetic 
polymorphism should be treated as meaningless for an individual outside that family.  It could 
not be presumed to constitute any meaningful information and as such could not be considered a 
risk factor for that individual at all.  As such, for individuals with this neurodegenerative disease 
who were not a members of the initial pedigree family, a determination of whether that 
individual had possessed either genetic polymorphism A or B would have not provided any 
meaningful information on their respiratory prognosis.  Therefore, the presence or absence of 
these polymorphisms could not serve as the basis for determining if that individual’s 
neurodegenerative disease should be considered an acceptable or unacceptable degree of risk of 
poor outcome within the context of potential kidney transplantation.  In contrast, if the predictive 
value of genetic polymorphisms A and B in the setting of our theoretical neurodegenerative 
disease were established across a broad population through a candidate gene study with robust 
findings (and ideally several confirmatory candidate gene studies), the presence or absence of 
these polymorphisms among potential transplant candidates could be validly used to inform the 
decision as to whether or not their neurodegenerative disease represented an acceptable or 
unacceptable risk of poor outcome when being considered for a potential kidney transplantation.  
The distinction between the scenario in which our understanding of the prognosis of a 
given disease state is informed by pedigree-based research and one in which it is informed by a 
candidate gene study is a profound one.  Both may illustrate an identical biological fact, that in 
the setting of this neurologic disease having genetic polymorphism A is associated with an 
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increased likelihood of a rapid progression of your illness, but what physicians can claim to 
“know” about a given patient’s prognosis is radically different based on how this biological fact 
was identified.   
 How then would we interpret the results of a GWA study?  The study might identify 
dozens or even hundreds of markers, each associated with an increased risk of a poor outcome.  
Using modern computational analytics it will likely be possible to construct an individualized 
“risk profile” which could result in a numerical assessment of the overall risk of a poor outcome 
following organ transplantation.  The ability of these risk profiles to accurately assess risk within 
a given population will likely improve as multiple GWA studies are used to generate them.  
However, the fundamental difficulty of determining whether or not these risk profiles are 
appropriate for use for an individual may be persistent, limited by our ability to generalize the 
findings of GWA from one population to another or to appropriately interpret the influence that 
sub-populations have on data interpretation.   It remains to be seen if new statistical 
methodologies will address this problem sufficiently.59 
 Broad based genetic sequencing techniques are already being used in the clinical setting.  
While many laboratories performing genetic sequencing attempt to limit their reports to 
information relevant to the specific clinical question being investigated (and/or other specified 
important incidental findings) reporting practices are not uniform in this regard.60  By examining 
the polymorphisms detected by these clinically approved tests, in conjunction with published 
                                                 
59 See Lacour et al. (2015, Chen et al. (2016, Jelizarow et al. (2016, Stephan et al. (2015) for discussion of new 
approaches to address population stratification. 
60 As an example, Baylor Miracia Genetics Laboratories currently offers the option of an expanded whole exome 
sequencing report which will provide information on genes that do not appear to be relevant to the question being 
addressed, including “pathogenic variants and unclassified variants (VUS) in genes unrelated to the disease 
phenotype” as well as “deleterious mutations in genes with no currently known association with disease in humans.” 
They also offer an “Adult Screening Exome Sequencing” test which is used when “…a patient's medical history and 
physical exam findings are normal, but the patient desires information about potential future risk of developing a 
genetic disorder.”  See http://bmgl.com/resources/educational-materials for additional information. 
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research findings identifying genetic polymorphisms associated with poor transplant outcomes, a 
transplant center may use this information in making the clinical decision regarding whether a 
potential transplant candidate has an acceptable or unacceptable degree of risk of a poor 
transplant outcome.  Furthermore, while genetic-based risk profiles are rare within clinical 
medicine at this time, there have been multiple publications within the medical literature which 
have called for their development.61  These genetic-based risk profiles will likely be derived in 
large part from GWAS, thereby incorporating a measure of such studies limitations. 
 Although the use of information obtained from GWAS underscores the difficulties in 
translating exploratory research into a suitable and substantial basis for policy or clinical 
decision making, a reasonable counterargument would be that this difficulty may simply be one 
of degree, rather than one of kind.  Questions about the quality and applicability of any research 
finding to a given clinical question are not new.  Moreover,  it may be argued that eventually 
there should be sufficient research data existent to enable the findings of studies investigating a 
genetic predisposition to an increased risk of poor transplant outcomes to inform decisions 
regarding whether or not organ transplantation is appropriate for a given patient.   I contend, 
however, that an important limitation will remain: the risk profiles derived from GWA studies 
will always be generated from an observed statistical association between certain genetic 
polymorphisms and the outcome being studied within a specified population, and therefore it will 
always be difficult to quantify the degree of uncertainty when applying this profile to an 
individual patient who may or may not fall within that population.  Appropriately, there is a 
strong presumption that this limitation is less pronounced when using information derived from 
candidate gene studies, where the information derived can be interpreted in light of our 
                                                 
61 See Carbone et al. (2014), Abraham and Inouye (2015), and Muller et al. (2016). 
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understanding of biochemical, cellular and physiologic processes that are thought to be near-
universal among people.   
  Despite these limitations, specific features of the transplantation landscape may make 
utilization of genetic factors that ostensibly predict clinical outcomes and graft survival very 
attractive. The next section discusses these features and ethical concerns associated with such 
utilization of genetic information. 
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4.0 GENETICS AND JUSTICE:  AN EXAMINATION OF THE ETHICAL AND SOCIAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE USE OF GENETIC PREDICTORS IN ORGAN ALLOCATION 
DECISIONS 
 
 
4.1  PERVERSE OR APPROPRIATE:  PROGRAM INCENTIVES AND ORGAN 
ALLOCATION 
 
One important way in which organ transplantation and organ allocation process differs from 
many areas in medicine is in the rigorous way in which the outcomes of organ transplantation are 
tracked.  Since 2007, the Center for Medicaid Services (CMS) has formally tracked individual 
transplant program outcomes as a criterion for determining whether or not they will contract with 
those programs to provide transplantation services for their patients.62 Although CMS managed 
programs (i.e., Medicaid and Medicare) serve as the guarantor for only a portion of all 
transplantations performed, their regulations and payment agreements often serve as an 
important model for other private insurers.63  Although the methods of calculating the expected 
rates of poor transplant outcomes have shifted over time,64 the implications—for  transplantation 
programs and their overarching institutions—of falling outside those expected rates have 
                                                 
62 See Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (2007). 
63 See Gupta et al. (2015). 
64 Ibid. 
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remained serious:  potential suspension or revocation of the agreement to allow those programs 
to participate in transplantations occurring under CMS oversight.   The implementation of these 
program-specific reports and the associated potential for penalties incurred for poor outcomes 
have shifted programs’ clinical approach.  In a survey performed in 2009, Schold and colleagues 
found that 58% of responding programs had increased the strictness of their selection criteria in 
order to exclude potential transplant recipients deemed to be at a relatively higher risk of a poor 
outcome post-transplant in an effort to improve outcomes and avoid CMS censure.65   
 Whether or not this move toward transplant programs being more selective when 
considering patient eligibility for organ transplantation represents an overall improvement of the 
transplant process depends on one’s viewpoint.  There is a relatively broad consensus that 
transplant should be avoided in circumstances where a poor outcome is very likely (as per my 
designation of unacceptable risk). However, whether or not a marginal improvement in survival 
rates in exchange for more restricted access to transplantation for potential transplant recipients 
is appropriate/acceptable depends on the relative value that one places on the various goals of 
transplantation (e.g., efficacy, justice, fairness).   
Irrespective of whether or not one sees this increased selectivity exhibited by transplant 
programs as desirable, we should not be surprised that this increased selectivity has occurred in 
the wake of CMS oversight.  If a transplant center’s authorization to perform organ transplants 
for CMS patients is revoked due to poor outcomes, that center will suffer a significant economic 
and reputational blow, particularly since many private insurers will also refuse to pay for organ 
transplants at non-CMS approved centers as well.  Economic theory has identified that when 
faced with decisions involving risks, economic agents place a greater emphasis on protecting 
                                                 
65 See Schold et al. (2010). 
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those goods they already possess, rather than objectively assessing the relative value of actions to 
expand those goods.  This concept, known as prospect theory, was first proposed in in 1979 by 
Khaneman and Taversky.66 Subsequent economic research has re-affirmed the role that 
psychological perceptions or risk play in the decision making process.67  Given these findings, 
the tendency of individual transplant programs to place increased restrictions on eligibility for 
transplantation in light of the risk of receiving a poor program specific report is very much in 
line with our current understanding of human behavior. 
 In light of this tendency that many transplant programs may have toward risk avoidance 
and loss aversion, it would seem possible to predict what effect the identification of emerging 
genetic polymorphisms which predict poor transplant outcomes may have on the behavior of 
transplant programs.  While such predictions are inherently speculative, I think the emergence of 
a multitude of new “risk factors” may only serve to reinforce the tendency of many individual 
programs to avoid listing these presumably “high–risk” patients as candidates for transplantation.   
There is a great deal of complexity involved in appropriately assessing and applying the 
findings of genetic research studies as a tool to either develop tests for clinical application or 
inform the interpretation of existing clinical data.  Although errors resulting from this complexity 
can be mitigated by rigorous science and careful consideration of the available literature, it is 
important to note that the incentives inherent in the CMS overview program do not support a 
position of studied neutrality as a broad scientific consensus emerges. These incentives instead 
support an approach much akin to the “precautionary principle” of risk management, wherein if a 
potential risk is identified, it should be treated as a presumed risk unless there is clear indication 
otherwise.  There is very little downside on a programmatic level to doing so.  In contrast, the 
                                                 
66 See Kahneman and Tversky (1979).  This line of inquiry was suggested by Gupta et al. (2015). 
67 See Barberis (2012). 
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potential negative implications of losing CMS certification due to poor transplant outcomes for 
the program are immense.   
As genetic testing becomes more affordable and efficient, the likelihood that individual 
patients will have pre-existing genetic data available will become greater.  Moreover, increasing 
research into genetic markers of poor transplant outcome are very likely to eventually yield 
clinical tests to assess for a pre-disposition to a poor transplant outcome.  These tests are likely to 
yield a vast amount of information, some of which may be easy to apply, but much of which will 
be of uncertain value.  Aside from concerns about the pernicious effect that the “identification” 
of these genetic risk factors may have on the candidate evaluation decisions made by individual 
risk averse programs, we should also consider the ethical and sociological implications of 
incorporating these predictors into allocation decisions more broadly.  How do these risk 
predictors compare to the other predictors which we have formally or uniformly incorporated? 
 
 
4.2  THE ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE USE OF GENETIC PREDICTORS OF POOR 
TRANSPLANT OUTCOMES 
 
4.2.1  Genes whose effect on outcome is not mediated by behavior  
 
In the previous sections we discussed how to consider genetic predictors along the axis of 
acceptable and unacceptable degrees of risk.  I explicitly avoided attempting to determine what 
should be considered an unacceptable degree of risk of poor outcome.  But, if either an 
individual transplant program or the organ allocation system as a whole has defined (even 
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loosely) what constitutes an unacceptable degree of risk of a poor outcome, then consideration of 
a newly identified genetic predictor is comparatively straightforward.  One simply has to 
compare the likelihood of a poor transplant outcome predicted by the presence of the genetic 
polymorphism in question to the likelihood of a poor transplant outcome predicted by a currently 
considered clinical or historical factor.  If both predictors (genetic and non-genetic) predict a 
similar likelihood of risk of a poor outcome, both should either be considered acceptable or 
unacceptable degrees of risk.  It is also possible that a given predictor (genetic or non-genetic) as 
an isolated factor predicts an acceptable degree of risk, but when that predictor is combined with 
a patient’s other health information, the overall risk of a poor outcome following transplantation 
is deemed too great  Again, provided that all predictors which suggest a similar likelihood of risk 
of a poor outcome are treated similarly when considering whether or not a patient is eligible for 
transplantation, there is little ethical concern.  In practice this will be much more complicated 
due to the difficulty of appropriately applying the findings of genetic research to the assessment 
of individual patients, as well as the fact that many candidate eligibility decisions are based on 
qualitative clinical judgement rather than a precise quantitative determination of risk.  However, 
the conceptual model for determining if a genetic predictor of poor transplant outcome indicates 
either an acceptable or unacceptable degree of risk is relatively straightforward. 
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4.2.2  Genes whose effect on outcome is mediated by behavior  
 
A more ethically rich analysis is called for when the increased risk predicted by a genetic marker 
is mediated by behaviors.  Should consideration of these genetic risk factors within the allocation 
system be considered just or unjust? 
 Again, comparison to other risk factors and their treatment within the candidate 
evaluation process should be made. Justice demands that similar risks be treated similarly.  An 
initial question is whether genetic risk factors mediated by behavior can be regarded like those 
health behaviors which, as a matter of social consensus, have led to patients being assigned 
lower priority in access to organs (e.g., alcoholism).  Patients have no control over their genome; 
it is inherited from their parents. Thus patients cannot be considered to have moral agency in 
regard to the genetic risk itself. 68 This suggests that genetic risk factors themselves should not 
be subject to the special consideration given to behavior driven risk factors (e.g., tobacco or 
alcohol use) discussed previously in section 2.   
Next we must ask whether, even if the potential recipient is not culpable for his or her 
genetic predisposition, those individuals may be regarded as culpable either for not pursuing 
what are deemed to be reasonable steps to mitigate the genetic risk or for engaging in behaviors 
which potentiate this genetic risk, and if so, whether this can ground their being given lower 
priority for, or being excluded from, access to organs.  In the case of patients for whom the 
combination of genetic risk factors and behaviors results in a degree of risk of an unacceptable 
risk of poor transplant outcome,  it is appropriate to determine that such patients are not 
transplant candidates.  However, it is important to note that in this circumstance it this is due to 
                                                 
68 See Tognazzini (2014) for a discussion of some of the morally relevant concepts.   
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the quantity of increased risk, not because this increased risk was mediated by behavior.  As an 
example, consider the circumstance in which an individual is deemed not to be a transplant 
candidate due to morbid obesity.  Many transplant centers will not transplant patients with body 
mass indexes (BMI) greater than 35 or 40 kg/m2, due to concerns of increased surgical morbidity 
and mortality in this population .69  This determination is not dependent on whether the patient 
has a medical condition (genetic or otherwise) that predisposes him or her to becoming obese or 
whether the patient’s obesity was the result of behavior alone; it is simply the result of patient’s 
perceived increase in risk.  In this circumstance, the patient’s genotype is irrelevant; only the 
outcome matters. 
 One might ask whether we should consider a genetic predisposition to poor health 
behaviors (and the resulting illnesses) as an excusing factor that should cause us to discount or 
disregard the associated increased risk of poor transplant outcomes.  This in turn might cause us 
to deem a patient an acceptable transplant candidate when a simple quantitative assessment of 
risk would indicate otherwise.  Taking genetic predisposition into account in such a manner 
would be inappropriate given our prevailing transplant eligibility criteria.  There has been no 
broad effort to do so for conditions, such as alcoholism, which are already known to have a 
significant genetic component, as discussed previously.  To consider genetic predisposition for 
only some health behaviors resulting in deleterious conditions would violate the tenet that similar 
risks should be treated similarly. 
Finally, we can consider the circumstance in which patients are known to have a genetic 
trait that would predispose them to an especially poor transplant outcome if they were to engage 
in particular behaviors, but they have yet to exhibit such behaviors.  As an example, consider a 
                                                 
69 See Bunnapradist and Danovitch (2007). 
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patient who is known to be a hyper-metabolizer of calcineurin inhibitors, the primary class of 
immunosuppressant used in the post-transplant setting.  One might reasonably presume that if 
such patients were to miss scheduled doses of their medication in the post-transplant setting they 
would be at an increased risk of rejection as compared to patients who missed a similar number 
of doses but were slower metabolizers of the medications, simply because the patients who 
hyper-metabolize would have insufficient drug levels for a longer period of time.70  However, if 
we have no reason to think that it is likely that a given patient will be non-adherent in the post-
transplant setting, is this potentially increased risk of poor transplant outcome a sufficient reason 
to deem that patient ineligible for organ transplantation?  I would argue that it is not, as such 
speculation could be applied to almost any health outcome.  A previously adherent patient could 
become floridly non-adherent following the stress of undergoing organ transplantation.  A 
patient who is considered an ideal transplant candidate could experience a motor vehicle accident 
shortly after transplantation, resulting in a degree of chronic illness which would have precluded 
transplantation if it was known that this would occur.  We do not generally consider patients to 
be ineligible for transplant due to these speculative concerns. As such, absent evidence of the 
behavior of concern, a genetic predisposition to a poor transplant outcome that is contingent on 
such behavior should be insufficient to consider a patient ineligible for transplant as well.  
  
                                                 
70 This is consistent with the findings of Rojas et al. (2015) 
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4.2.3  Genetic predictors and individual equity of transplant opportunity 
 
How would the inclusion of genetic predictors of poor transplant outcome in allocation decisions 
affect the individual equity of opportunity to benefit from the transplant program?   As an 
experiment, let us presume that over the next few years, researchers identify 10 genetic markers 
which are closely linked to a five-fold increase in the likelihood of rejection within the first 5 
years after transplant.  These predictors have been confirmed by several studies, all represent 
mutations within biochemical pathways known to modulate immune response to foreign tissue, 
and have similar probabilistic weight through all gender and ethnic groups studied thus far.  
After much consideration, UNOS has elected to exclude patients with these genetic markers from 
transplant of any organs.  Does such a decision preserve individual equity of access? 
From a purely objective viewpoint it appears that at least in one sense, the answer is yes.  
If the likelihood of a poor transplant outcome indicated by these genetic predictors was great 
enough, they could be considered in a similar manner to any other predictor of an unacceptable 
degree of risk, such as extremely poor health. However it should be noted that, as discussed in 
section 2, there are currently few system-wide exclusionary criteria. Most comparisons for 
questions of individual equity involve questions of prioritization, rather than inclusion or 
exclusion. This distinction between lower prioritization and complete exclusion is of relatively 
little importance from an ethical standpoint, as any factor which could grant priority for 
transplantation for one individual over another may have the practical effect of denying organ 
transplantation for the party given lower priority who will either die while awaiting an organ 
transplantation or experience health deterioration rendering him or her no longer eligible for 
transplantation.   However, I suspect that socially and psychologically outright exclusion based 
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on genotype would be seen as a distinct phenomenon, an argument that I will explore more fully 
in the next section. 
However, even if one were to deem the inclusion of genetic predictors in the candidate 
selection process just because it represents a rule that is universally applied, one could still 
criticize their use for being arbitrary.  There are likely numerous other predictors which, if 
thoroughly studied, would yield a similar degree of risk as theorized genetic markers.  For 
example, it is possible to construct profiles of associated co-morbidities which are associated 
with poor transplant outcomes.  At the moment, profiles such as the Charlson Comorbidity 
Index71 are primarily used as research tools, but they could be converted to formal decision tools 
within the UNOS guidelines.   No ethically relevant difference exists between a genetic predictor 
and these other forms of outcome prediction. Thus, the inclusion of particular predictors (which 
have otherwise been deemed to not implicate an unacceptable degree of risk and for which the 
potential transplant recipient cannot be deemed to be morally culpable) within a formal 
allocation scheme while disregarding other similar predictors is arbitrary and therefore difficult 
to justify from an ethical standpoint.  
Thus far this section has addressed ethical difficulties which may arise from the inclusion 
of genetic predictors within the formal allocation criteria of UNOS or other overarching 
allocation programs.  However, it is important to examine the ethical implications of individual 
transplant programs electing to include genetic predictors among candidate evaluation criteria.  
In this case, the ethical concerns do not arise from the nature of predictors used (i.e., that they are 
derived from genetic data) but instead the furthering of variance between the practices of various 
programs.   
                                                 
71 See Grosso et al. (2012) for an example of the used of the CCI for research purposes. 
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The ethical concerns raised by program to program differences in candidate evaluation 
criteria in general have been discussed elsewhere.72 There are substantial differences in expected 
wait time between various geographic regions within the United States and significant variation 
in expected wait times for organ allografts within a given region.73 There are also differences in 
the quality of the organs accepted for transplantation,74 differences which result in significant 
variation in overall transplant outcome.  Although in theory any given transplant center is open 
to any patient, there are significant logistical, economic and insurance barriers which serve as 
practical limitations on this option.  The transplant candidate evaluation process is a lengthy one, 
requiring many days or weeks of testing.  As such, it can be quite difficult for individuals outside 
the immediate vicinity of a given transplant center to participate.  Moreover, the time 
commitment necessary to complete mandatory testing and interviews may be prohibitive for 
some individuals who lack the requisite flexibility in personal obligations.   Insurance policies 
may have agreements in place which limit the policy holders to transplantation only at certain 
institutions.  While it is possible for a potential recipient with sufficient economic resources to 
overcome some of these barriers, the differentiation of potential recipients based on economic 
resources is contrary to the ethical foundation of our organ allocation policy as currently 
constructed.75 
The current system accepts substantial program-to-program variation for a variety of 
pragmatic reasons. The aforementioned geographic variation in organ allocation, for example,  
reflects the regionalized origins of our allocation system, as well as the fact that any changes in 
                                                 
72 See Barshes et al. (2006). 
73  See the staff working and discussion paper titled, “The Ethics of Organ Allocation” by 
 Davis and Wolitz (2006) prepared for the September 2006 meeting of the President’s Council on Bioethics for a 
succinct and well-written characterization of this issue.   
74 See Axelrod et al. (2010) and Volk et al. (2011) as examples of this phenomena. 
75 See the UNOS website at (https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/governance/strategic-plan/) for a statement of the 
strategic and policy goals of UNOS/OPTN. 
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our current system will result in harms as well as benefits to individual parties, whether or not 
such a development would be objectively more “just.”  Indeed, given the improved modes of 
transportation and organ preservation, the regional allocation system is being increasingly 
questioned.76  Additionally, the current system as constructed reinforces the responsibility that 
individualized transplant centers have for the outcomes of their patients and such responsibility 
is hard to instill if those programs are not granted any agency in the decision making process. 
However, while there is a “natural” or “historical” explanation for much of the existing 
variation between individual center practices, introducing additional variation between centers 
should not be undertaken lightly, particularly if doing so exacerbates the situational inequities 
noted above.  Individual centers incorporation of genetic predictors as part of their candidate 
evaluation criteria would create a substantial variation in practice that would reduce the equity of 
access to organ allocation as determined by our current framework and goals. 
 
  
                                                 
76 See Vladeck et al. (2012) for one such argument. 
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4.3  THE SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE USE OF GENETIC PREDICTORS OF POOR 
TRANSPLANT OUTCOMES 
 
There are some broader concerns regarding the use of genetic predictors relevant to the integrity 
of and trust in the transplantation system as a whole. The transplantation system within the 
United States is dependent upon the voluntary donation of deceased donor organs.  As such, 
societal concerns about justice in the organ allocation system have the potential to greatly affect 
the number of organs made available for transplantation.77 The use of genetic predictors of poor 
transplant outcomes may have substantial implications for public perception of the justice of the 
system, its trust in it, and its willingness to support it. 
The exclusion of some groups of patients—for example, those who are very ill and 
unlikely to survive transplantation—is generally accepted by the public presumably for three 
reasons:  the criterion is uniformly applied, all people have a similar chance of being excluded 
due to the criterion, and most importantly, the criterion is tied to the efficacious use of available 
organs. In contrast, the notion of excluding individuals based on their genotype, with no outward 
manifestations of their “unsuitability” for transplant may not be as widely accepted.  Even if the 
genetic criteria are applied to all who are evaluated, the use of genetic information seems to sort 
people according to their natures, not according to some transplantation-relevant contingent 
feature of them. Further, the connection between genotype and transplant outcome will be far 
less obvious than a connection between current health status and transplant outcome (“he is too 
                                                 
77 There was a significant decrease in organ donation rates in Germany after it was revealed in 2013 that four 
German hospitals were manipulating the organ transplant allocation system to secure organs more quickly for their 
patients.  See Shaw et al. (2013) for further details. 
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sick to benefit”). While both genotype and health status are predictors of transplant outcome, 
health status is more obviously and likely is more proximately related to that outcome. 
If genetic predictors are found to be more prevalent among ethnic groups which have 
historically been disadvantaged in medicine in general and transplant in particular, questions of 
justice and concerns about maintaining public confidence would likely arise. 78  Although no 
such markers have been identified thus far, the potential for this to occur exists.  Moreover, there 
are clearly documented differences in outcomes after transplantation, for particular minority 
groups.79,80  While these differences have largely been attributed to social,  systemic factors (e.g.,  
economic, demographic, and sociologic factors, as well as disparities in the care experience) the 
question of race/ethnicity-associated biological differences affecting transplant outcomes have 
been raised.81  This question is further complicated by the fact that for several decades minority 
populations have been under-represented in medical research,82 which may result in an 
inaccurate or incomplete scientific understanding of how different therapeutic regimens affect 
different populations.  As an example, research has identified important ethnic differences in 
response to tacrolimus, a medication which has been the mainstay of kidney (and other solid-
organ transplantation) for the past two decades.83   
 It would be difficult to overstate the enormity of the controversy which could arise if 
genetic predictors of a poor transplant outcome were found to be substantially more prevalent 
                                                 
78 Research into ethnic differences in biology and health is fraught for a variety of scientific and historical reasons.  
See Lee et al. (2001) for a discussion into some of these issues. 
79 Note:  For the purpose of this discussion I will use the term minority group as a descriptor for groups that are 
generally thought to be disadvantaged as compared to the majority culture (i.e., white Americans). The language 
used in this area of research has shifted over time, so there is not a single unifying terminology.  I make this 
distinction to note that these disparities exist even in circumstances where the majority of patients represent 
“minority” groups. 
80 See Fan et al. (2010), Kemmer and Neff (2010), or Kilic et al. (2015) as examples. 
81 Ibid. 
82 See George et al. (2013) for a broad overview of this issue. 
83 See Taber et al. (2015). 
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within a historically disadvantaged minority group.84  Such a finding would draw attention to the 
inherent complexities of the ethics of justice I discussed in section 2, particularly the tension 
between the goal of treating potential transplant recipients equitably as individuals, respecting 
their rights to “fair” rules and consistent standards for acceptable efficacy which are applied to 
all individuals equally, and the concurrent goal of achieving distributive justice among various 
societal groups.   
 If such a genetic predictor of poor transplant outcome is identified and if it is more 
prevalent among a particular minority group or groups,  it may nevertheless be considered as 
equivalent to—and employed in a manner similar to—any other predictor that identifies a risk of 
poor outcome of similar magnitude.  Employing such predictors that are disproportionately 
prevalent among minority groups would be contrary to the widely held goal of reducing ethnic 
disparities in organ transplantation, as well as the specific goals listed in the Organ Procurement 
and Transplantation Network strategic goals.85  The community response to consideration of a 
predictor that disproportionately disadvantages a minority group in terms of access to 
transplantation may be profound. Members of that minority group (and perhaps other groups) 
may reduce their organ donation rates. Moreover, to the extent that the public as a whole 
perceives disparities, and thus injustice, in the transplantation system, there may be an overall 
reduction in organ donation.86      
                                                 
84 I would note that these concerns are predicated on the presumption that any identified genetic predictor would:   
A) Reflect an increased risk of sufficient magnitude that inclusion of this predictor in organ allocation decisions on 
either an institutional or system-wide level would be considered; and, B) The number of people affected would be 
sufficient that it would be noted by society at large.  The exact thresholds for either of these conditions are beyond 
the scope of this manuscript. 
 
85 See Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (2016). 
86 Again see Shaw et al. (2013) for further details regarding reductions in organ donation following a 2013 scandal 
in Germany. 
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 The identification of a genetic predictor of poor transplant outcome which is more 
prevalent in a given racial ethnic group (or any other socially disadvantaged group) would be 
reminiscent of the debate over the decision to disregard HLA-B matching as discussed in section 
2.  There would, however, be several important differences.  In regard to the HLA-B issue, the 
question at hand was whether to move from a more restrictive allocation policy to a more open 
one.  In the situation described above, in contrast, the decision would be whether or not to move 
from a more open to a more restrictive allocation policy.   From an ethical standpoint the two 
should be considered equivalent.  Both offer a choice between two potential algorithms, one 
which values efficacy over questions of distributive justice and one that values questions of 
distributive justice over efficacy.  (The uniformity and objective nature of the rules established 
limit objections with regards to equity of individual access, provided other similar predictors 
were treated similarly.)   
 From an experiential standpoint however, the decision of whether one should expand the 
availability of transplant by offering a given organ to a broader array of individuals or if one 
should be more restrictive and allow fewer individuals to be potential recipients of a given organ 
is markedly different.87 By defining the initial state as either more or less restricted, our sense of 
responsibility for deviation from that initial state differs.  In many ways, this is similar to the 
discussion surrounding withholding and withdrawing care.  Although they are viewed to be 
equivalent from a dispassionate ethical viewpoint, they are experienced by many as radically 
different acts.88  Because of the importance of maintaining public support for organ 
                                                 
87 See Bostrom and Ord (2006) for an interesting discussion of this phenomenon and a review of some of the 
pertinent psychological literature. 
88See Anonymous (1992) 
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transplantation, the manner in which a decision to expand or restrict access is experienced 
matters. 
 Finally, we must consider the fact that inclusion of genetic test results among the criteria 
for determining transplantation eligibility has the potential to create new “at-risk” populations, 
similar to the gender, ethnic and socio-economic groups already considered at-risk for poor 
health outcomes and health care in this country. Given that genetic testing remains relatively rare 
throughout society as a whole, it is difficult to predict the extent to which identification of a 
genetic marker predicting a poor transplant outcome would contribute to the formation of a 
meaningful social group or give rise to significant social stigma.  However, we may gain some 
insight into this phenomenon by examining groups in which genetic testing is more prevalent.  
One such group is the Hassidic Jewish community.89  This community is predominantly of 
Ashkenazi heritage, and members have a disproportionally greater likelihood of being a carrier 
of several serious genetic conditions, such as Tay-Sachs disease or the BRCA1 mutation, as 
compared to the population as a whole.90  Moreover, it is traditional for members of this 
community to find spouses within the community, often by arranged marriages.  As such, there is 
substantial awareness of the risks of genetic conditions and significant stigma associated with 
being a member of a family who has members who have these diseases.  In a sense, this familial 
membership is used a surrogate marker to define a presumed carrier state.  This presumed carrier 
state can lead to social sequela, including increased barriers to finding a spouse through the 
traditional process of arranged marriages and a sense of social stigma.91  
                                                 
89 See Raz and Vizner (2008) for an interesting discussion of this topic. 
90 See Hoffman et al. (2014) andMcClain, Nathanson, et al. (2005) for data regarding carrier rates in the Ashkenazi 
population. 
91 See Lehmann et al. (2002) and Raz and Vizner (2008). 
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   Within the broader population, possessing a given genetic trait may result in fewer 
psycho-social effects.  However, as people’s awareness of their own genetic traits increase, 
through both the increased use of genetic testing for medical purposes as well as the increased 
use of consumer driven genetic analysis, it is possible that importance or influence of genetic 
traits in constituting social groups may increase.92  In this context, the psychological and social 
implications of having been determined to be genetically “unfit” to receive an organ transplant 
may be significant.   
 
 
4.4  QUALITY OF LIFE OR SAVING LIFE:  HOW THE PRESENCE OF ALTERNATIVE 
THERAPIES SHAPES THE QUESIONTS OF JUSTICE 
 
Within the field of organ transplantation there are two broad categories of organs:  those for 
which a transplant is necessary to continue life, such as heart, lungs and liver, and those for 
which a transplant improves a patient’s health and quality of life, such as kidneys and pancreas 
In renal transplantation, alternative life-sustaining therapy exists in the form of dialysis.  
However, the quality of life for those who undergo transplant and those who do not is widely 
divergent.93   It is well documented that individuals suffering from chronic kidney disease have 
substantial improvements in their longevity and quality of life as compared to individuals who 
remain dialysis dependent.94 Still, the difference in the outcomes and experiences between those 
                                                 
92See Lee and Crawley (2009). 
93 See Laupacis et al. (1996). 
94 See Port et al. (1993) and Simmons et al. (1984) as representative publications. 
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who receive a kidney transplant and those who do not is obviously less significant than among 
those individuals who require organ transplants to sustain life.   
 Nevertheless, the prospect of using genetic predictors in renal transplantation raises an 
additional consideration. Because the life-saving option of dialysis exists, having kidney 
transplantation is therefore a matter of quality of life. Therefore, it would be appropriate to  be 
more conservative—i.e., require a greater prospect of good outcome—in the context of renal 
transplantation than in the context of life-saving organ transplantation. For this reason, we might 
be more liberal in employing genetic predictors of poor outcome to exclude potential candidates. 
 As an example, consider a genetic polymorphism which is associated an 85% percent 
likelihood of allograft failure within the first 3 years after transplantation.  It may be ethically 
appropriate to exclude a candidate for kidney transplantation who possesses this polymorphism 
because a reasonable alternative therapy exists (i.e. dialysis), while if a similar candidate was 
being considered for a liver transplantation it would be appropriate to proceed with 
transplantation (despite the decreased likelihood of allograft and patient survival conferred by the 
genetic polymorphism), because no alternative therapy exists.   
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5.0 PHILOSOPHY, MEET POLICY:  A PROPOSAL FOR INCORPERATION OF 
GENETIC RISK ANALYSIS WITHIN THE CURRENT ALLOCATION SYSTEM 
 
 
As discussed in section 4, there are significant ethical and social implications which would arise 
if genetic risk analysis were incorporated into the decision making process regarding candidate 
evaluation and organ allocation.  The gravity of these implications might suggest that all such 
consideration should be prohibited.  Unfortunately, such a prohibition would be very difficult to 
enforce.  Under the current system, individual programs are given wide latitude in determining 
whether a given potential recipient is an acceptable candidate.  No mechanism currently exists to 
curtail the consideration of genetic information.  Although rules could be constructed to forbid 
programs from performing genetic testing for the purpose of predicting transplant outcome and 
candidate suitability, such rules would likely be insufficient to fully enforce a ban on the use of 
genetic risk profiles.   
 As discussed previously, there has already been an increased shift towards the use of 
whole exome and whole genome sequencing in place of targeted clinical genetic testing.95  
While such sequencing can be a powerful tool in identifying genetic variation that can contribute 
to a given disease, it also can identify a variety of ‘incidental’ findings (i.e. genetic variations 
which may be of clinical significance but may not be related to the original purpose of testing).  
Although some recommendations regarding the reporting of such incidental findings have been 
                                                 
95 See Biesecker  and Green (2014). 
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made,96 there is variation in practices between individual laboratories and institutions.  Thus, it is 
possible that ‘incidental’ findings pertinent to predicting a patient’s transplant outcome may 
already exist and be recorded in the patient’s medical record.  While this may seem like a 
somewhat far-fetched concern, this risk may be greater than one would think.  Although 
investigation into genes that affect transplant response is still preliminary at this stage, it is 
presumed that the genes identified will predominantly affect traits such as immune modulation or 
the response to pertinent immunosuppressant drugs.  It is entirely plausible that these genes will 
have clinical relevance for a variety of other conditions, particularly conditions such as auto-
immune disorders, which are a common cause of organ failure.   As genetic testing and 
sequencing become more prevalent, the likelihood of genetic data pertinent to the transplant 
evaluation process already being available for a given potential recipient becomes more likely. 
 If it is not feasible to forbid the collection of pertinent genetic data, how then should it be 
incorporated?  How should this incorporation reflect the transitional nature of scientific 
knowledge, wherein certain genetic markers will be suspected of predicting a poor outcome long 
before the strength or certainty of that prediction is clearly established?  How will policies 
regarding the use of genetic predictors in the candidate evaluation process reflect the pre-existing 
incentives developed by the regulatory systems which already incentivize programs from 
pursuing “risky” transplants and listing “risky” candidates?  Finally, how will these policies 
reflect the fact that research into these genetic predictors serves a legitimate purpose within the 
organ transplant system, both by identifying patients who are expected to have a poor outcome, 
thereby allowing us as a society to incorporate that information systematically into the candidate 
evaluation process, and by identifying populations who are ill-served by current pre- and post- 
                                                 
96 See Green et al. (2013). 
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transplantation care protocols, thereby allowing us to improve the clinical care for these 
population sub-groups?   
 To address concern about transplant programs’ incentives, I would recommend that 
patients who are found to have a genetic risk factor predicting a poor transplant outcome should 
be excluded from the assessment of program specific outcomes until such time that a nationwide 
policy on how to consider such genetic risk factors is determined.  This policy change would 
remove the incentive that individual programs may have to avoid transplantation in patients with 
these genetic markers, thereby avoiding the concerns regarding justice raised in section 4 of this 
manuscript.  It would also reduce the incentive to make clinical decisions regarding a patient’s 
candidacy based upon published studies that identify genetic risk factors which have not been re-
produced or demonstrated in relevant target populations.  Absent these incentives to avoid 
transplantation in individuals who possess genetic risk factors associated with increased rates of 
poor transplant outcomes, individual transplant programs could then determine whether genetic 
assessments of potential transplant recipients serve either a meaningful clinical or research 
purpose within their institutions.  This in turn may allow additional research on these topics, 
strengthening the quality of the findings and defining the applicability of the information 
obtained regarding genetic risk factors. 
 Further, I would recommend that UNOS establish a national database to prospectively 
track outcomes in patients who have been identified to have genetic polymorphisms suspected of 
being associated with any increased risk of poor transplant outcomes.  The polymorphisms 
recorded within this database should be selected by a national panel of experts, based on the 
results published in smaller populations by individual research groups.  In this way, the expert 
panel would identify genetic markers warranting more study, much in the way that NIH study 
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sections help to establish priorities for distribution of NIH research funds to topics of the greatest 
scientific interest.  Patients found to have a polymorphism of concern should be enrolled within 
this database as a condition for being listed for transplantation.  That patient’s outcomes could 
then be tracked, but would be excluded from consideration within the program-specific outcome 
reports. 
 The immediate research benefits of this program would be twofold.  First, by removing 
disincentives for individual programs to use genetic risk analysis to reject risky transplant 
candidates, we would likely be able to increase the size of the population studied in relation to 
any single presumed genetic risk factor.  This would increase the quality of the data obtained and 
may serve to either confirm or disprove the associations identified in smaller preliminary studies.  
Second, by nationalizing the study population within the United States, we would increase the 
likelihood that any identified associations between outcomes and genetic risk factors would be 
applicable across the broad US population, an important determination prior to considering the 
more routine clinical use of these genetic markers.  Ideally, this process of data aggregation 
would eventually result in a sufficiently comprehensive understanding of the risks associated 
with a given genetic marker to then consider this marker within a national context.  As I have 
discussed in previous sections, if a genetic marker is associated with a substantial risk of a poor 
transplant outcome it is not inherently unjust to consider it within the candidate evaluation 
process (although it is problematic). Moreover, the harms which arise from incorporation of such 
markers can be minimized if it is instituted in a uniform manner, ideally after having achieved a 
degree of societal agreement. 
 This is not to say that establishment of such a database is not without its own potential 
risks.   There would be a powerful incentive to conduct research on the genetic markers deemed 
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‘of interest’ within the database.  While this would likely strengthen the science aimed at 
understanding the usefulness of those particular genetic markers, it would run the risk of stifling 
research creativity with regard to other factors relevant to poor transplant outcomes. Resources 
may be diverted to investigate those markers selected by the relatively small cadre of experts.  
While it is true that this already happens to a certain extent within medical research, given the 
reliance that many researchers have on government funding for projects, the wide variety of 
funding sources available increases the diversity of scientific research somewhat.  Moreover, the 
establishment of such a database would almost necessarily result in a move towards a consortium 
model of research, in which many institutions pool aggregate data in order to strengthen the 
resulting analysis and conclusions.  While this model of research has many strengths, it does not 
correspond well with the prevailing model of individualized research grant assignment or 
academic hierarchies based on individualized academic achievements.  Such concerns may need 
to be addressed in order to enhance the appeal that a unified research database might have to 
individual programs and institutions. 
 Despite these limitations, I feel that enacting this proposal would be beneficial both to the 
patients who might otherwise be rejected as transplant candidates without sufficient scientific 
justification and to the research mission of the medical field as a whole. It is a model which 
could be easily extended to other important questions of prognosis, in which the possibility that a 
given recipient could have a poor outcome would adversely affect his or her likelihood of 
inclusion within the transplant allocation process, prior to there being a broad scientific and 
social consensus regarding the appropriateness of considering the prognosis predictor.  
 One could also consider the value of extending the proposed model (data-sharing and 
exclusion from program specific reports) to research into therapeutic regimens, such as 
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immunosuppressant therapy.  This may allow for more multi-center comparative research into 
the efficacy of given therapeutic regimens, in contrast to the common practice of individual 
programs publishing case series as a means of such assessment.97  It is important to note that 
extension of this model to encompass clinical interventions may bring additional problems that 
observational studies may not.  The current method of outcome assessment used in the program 
specific reports provides a powerful incentive to maintain the status quo for programs that are 
deemed “acceptable”.  This current method has two likely effects:  research into new modalities 
or protocols may be somewhat discouraged, while treatment consistent with the “standard of 
care” (or, more realistically in transplant, one of many standards of care) is reinforced.  
Liberating programs from the potentially devastating financial effects associated with a poor 
program specific report would allow them to pursue more novel therapies, but these novel 
therapies have the potential to result in poorer outcomes than the status quo.  Nevertheless, the 
ability to pursue novel therapies and protocols will likely be necessary to glean the maximal 
benefit from the identification of genetic predictors of transplant outcomes, by allowing our 
emerging understanding of interconnectedness between genetic markers and immune response to 
inform personalized and tailored therapeutic regimens. 
 
 
  
                                                 
97See Nehus et al. (2015) or Axelrod et al. (2016). 
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6.0 CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
Ultimately, the means by which we evaluate transplant candidates, as well as the protocols which 
we use to treat patients after they receive transplanted organs must improve and evolve.  Long 
term renal allograft outcomes have not substantially improved since the 1990’s with the median 
life-span of the transplanted kidneys being approximately 8 years for deceased donor kidneys 
and approximately 12 years for living donor kidneys.98  Although improvements in other solid 
organ transplants have fared somewhat better, improving from 5.8 to 8.5 years for liver, 1.7 to 
5.2 for lung, 8.8 to 11 for heart and 2.1 to 3.6 for intestine,  all remain well short of the amount 
of time necessary to prolong many patient’s lives to a “near normal” lifespan.99   
 Moreover, a severe shortage of organs available for transplant remains.  While 30,970 
organ transplants were performed in 2015, 121,416 people remained on the waiting list.100  The 
identification of genetic predictors of poor transplant outcomes and poor response to existing 
transplant therapies may help us determine if there are individuals who should not be considered 
for transplant due to excessively high risk, as well as individuals who would benefit from closer 
post-transplant monitoring. Identification of these genetic markers may even lead to other crucial 
advances in transplant medicine by affording a greater understanding of the process by which 
                                                 
98 See Lamb et al. (2011). 
99 See Lodhi et al. (2011). 
100 Data obtained from the OPTN website < https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/data/view-data-reports/national-data/> 
accessed 3/7/16. 
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transplanted organs are rejected.  Despite this importance however, emerging data regarding 
genetic predictors has the potential to be misunderstood, misused, or simply disregarded due to 
the complex ethical and social issues that can arise.  In order to provide the optimal care for 
potential transplant recipients, regardless of the transplant center at which they will receive care, 
we should develop a unified and systematic approach to studying genetic predictors of poor 
transplant outcome, an approach that is enhanced by my proposal to exclude those patients with 
genetic polymorphism undergoing study from inclusion in the program specific reports.    
Simultaneously with the process of identifying genetic predictors of poor transplant outcome, we 
should engage in the process of seeking a broad societal consensus regarding the degree to which 
they should be used in candidate evaluation and other aspects of transplantation policy.  This 
consensus is necessary to ensure that candidate evaluation and organ allocation policies continue 
striving to be both just and efficacious, despite the tension that currently and will continue to 
persist between those two goals.  
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